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This thesis consists of three independent chapters related to endogenous
growth models. Chapter 1 and Chapter 3 examine the effects of taxation;
Chapter 2 discusses the patent length policy in an endogenous growth model
with two types of innovation.
The first chapter examines the effects arising from the imposition of various
taxes in a Schumpeterian economy. The growth rate and the level of inequality
are jointly determined in equilibrium. The effects of fiscal policies may depend
on the time path of the economy. Therefore, I analyze both the transitional
dynamics and the steady state effects of the taxes. I find that there is an
optimal capital income tax that minimizes wealth inequality; before tax income
inequality is increasing in capital income tax, while both after tax income
inequality and welfare inequality are decreasing in capital income tax. Then
I examine the distributional effects of a taxation reform from lump-sum tax
to capital income tax or labor income tax. I show that capital income tax
financing leads to larger dynamic adjustment of inequality and also results in
higher wealth inequality and before tax income inequality. Furthermore, I do
several robustness checks by modifying model parameters and I show that the
patterns of the taxation effects are unchanged.
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In Chapter 2, I analyze the patent length in an endogenous growth model in
which growth is driven by variety expansion. In this model, there are two types
of R&D activities: Innovation and Standardization. Successful innovation in-
troduces a new variety and the new product is produced with high cost; Stan-
dardization targets on the existing high cost variety and lowers the production
cost if successful. The patent protection for innovation and standardization
then leads to resource reallocation between the two types of R&D investments
and also between high cost production and low cost production by changing
the returns to innovation and standardization. I show that the steady state
equilibrium can be classified by three different regimes. First, if patent length
for innovation is too long, there will be only innovation. Second, if patent
length for standardization is too long, the economy may fall into a poverty
trap that eliminates innovation. Finally, both innovation and standardization
can exist in equilibrium. When both innovation and standardization present,
the growth rate is increasing in the patent length for standardization, but is
unchanged by patent length for innovation. Given patent length for innova-
tion, there is a finite patent length for standardization that maximizes welfare.
Welfare is increasing in patent length for innovation.
Chapter 3 examines the effects of taxation on the long run distance to fron-
tier of the economy as well as the welfare and growth rate. The technological
vii
progress of an economy is assumed to be obtained from both innovation and
imitation. In this chapter, both innovation and imitation improve technology
level of the economy. Innovation targets on local technology frontier, while im-
itation targets on global technology frontier. I show that higher capital income
tax results in longer steady state distance to frontier while it increases steady
state welfare. By analyzing the transitional dynamics, I find that higher cap-
ital income tax will lead to lower current growth rate. The effect of capital
income tax on total welfare is inverse-U shaped.
viii
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Chapter 1
The Distributional Role of
Fiscal Policies in an Endogenous
Growth Model
1.1 Introduction
From 1970s, there is a rapid rise in the worldwide income inequality such as in
US and UK, reviving the interest in the issue of the trade-off between growth
and inequality. The distributional effects of fiscal policies in the neoclassical
models and AK growth models have been extensively studied in the literature.
However, it received less attention in the Schumpeterian growth models. In
this chapter, we construct a Schumpeterian growth model to examine the effect
of fiscal policies on the trade-off between growth and inequality.
The growth rate and inequality are simultaneously determined at equilib-
rium. Economic growth comes from endogenously determined innovation. In
addition, there is monopoly power in the intermediate goods sector. Monopoly
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power leads to less than optimal output on the one hand. On the other hand,
it provides more incentive to innovate and thus stimulates economic growth.
In the Schumpeterian model, fiscal policies redistribute income but they can
also affect the profits and thus the incentives to innovate. Therefore, it is nec-
essary to analyze the effects of fiscal policies on the growth rate and inequality
within the Schumpeterian growth model.
The joint determination of growth rate and distributions seems to be sup-
ported by the disagreement of empirical economists on the relationship be-
tween growth and inequality. Many researchers find that there is a negative
correlation between economic growth and inequality
(
e.g. Alesina and Rodrik
(1994), Person and Tabellini (1994) and Perotti (1996)
)
. However, later stud-
ies argue that inequality has positive or no effect on economic growth
(
e.g.
Forbes (2000) and Barro (2000)
)
. It is not surprising that economists find
controversial evidence, because both the inequality level and growth rate in-
teract with each other and are jointly determined at equilibrium. Policies that
affect the return to different factors will affect the distributions of income and
wealth. Likewise, policies targeted on distributions are also likely to influence
the aggregate economy. Consequently, if both reducing inequality and enhanc-
ing growth are the economic objectives, the governments may face a trade-off
between economic growth and inequality.
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To understand the trade-off between growth and inequality, it is neces-
sary to incorporate economic growth and distributional dynamics into one
model. Garcia-Penalosa and Turnovsky (2007) examine the roles of different
fiscal policies on the relationship between growth and inequality using an AK
model. However, one notable drawback of their model is that there is no tran-
sitional dynamics in their model and thus it is not possible to study the wealth
inequality as well as income dynamics. Garcia-Penalosa and Turnovsky (2011)
investigate the distributional dynamics with an Ramsey model, however eco-
nomic growth is missing. In the present Schumpeterian model, the wealth and
income dynamics are present, and economic growth is driven by purposeful
R&D investments.
We first study the revenue-neutral taxation effects on inequality measures.
In line with Aghion, Akcigit, and Fernandez-Villaverde (2013), a higher capital
income tax leads to a lower growth rate. As for distributions, the results show
that a higher capital income tax leads to lower after-tax income inequality and
welfare inequality, which is in line with Garcia-Penalosa and Turnovsky (2007).
Thus, the conventional trade-off between growth and inequality largely remains
in the quality ladder model. A novel finding is that there is a capital income
tax that minimizes wealth inequality. Therefore, it is possible to enhance
economic growth and reduce wealth inequality by reducing the capital income
3
tax when the capital income tax is initially high enough.
We then examine the distributional effects of a taxation reform from lump-
sum tax financing to capital income tax financing or labor income tax financ-
ing. We find that capital income tax financing leads to larger dynamic ad-
justment of inequality and results in higher wealth inequality and before-tax
income inequality. The after-tax income inequality and welfare inequality will
be lower than that under labor income tax financing. The results are largely
consistent with Garcia-Penalosa and Turnovsky (2011). We also analyze the
effect on growth. Capital income tax financing results in lower growth rate.
This chapter belongs to the large literature of the relationship between
growth and inequality. The classical view of the relationship generally sup-
ports a positive correlation between inequality and growth. Since marginal
propensity to save increases in personal wealth, higher inequality is beneficial
to capital accumulation and therefore leads to a higher growth rate. More re-
cent examinations of the relationship between growth and inequality seem to
depart from this view via two different channels. One strand is the credit mar-
ket imperfection channel. Galor and Zeira (1993) show that there is a negative
relationship between inequality and growth based on the assumptions of im-
perfect credit market and fixed cost associated with human capital investment.
Researchers such as Aghion and Bolton (1997) and Benabou (1996) argue that
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the redistribution to the poor may enhance growth based on the assumption of
credit market imperfection. Another strand is the political economy channel.
Due to the importance of the median voter, the poorer the median voter, the
higher demand for redistribution, thus the lower the growth rate
(
e.g. Bertola




This chapter also contributes to the Schumpeterian literature on inequality.
Foellmi and Zweimuller (2006) and Zweimuller (2000) examine the relationship
between growth and inequality from the demand side. Income distribution de-
termines the demand for innovative goods and thus the incentive to innovate.
Chol-Won Li (1998) argues that income distribution determines the market
structure. When inequality is relatively small, the market is monopolistic and
inequality leads to lower growth. However, when inequality is relatively high,
the market is in duopoly and inequality enhances growth. Garcia-Penalosa and
Wen (2008) argue that redistribution provides insurance to unsuccessful en-
trepreneurs and thus enhances growth. Several papers explained the widening
inequality in US with Schumpeterian framework. Dinopoulos and Segerstrom
(1999) and Sener (2001) demonstrate that trade liberalization is a source of
widening inequality. Acemoglu (1998, 2000) shows that skill-biased technol-
ogy lead to widening inequality. Aghion, Howitt and Violante (2002) explain
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the within educational group inequality based on the assumption of transfer-
ability of knowledge and general purpose technological progress. Although in
this chapter we do not deal with the causal relationship between growth and
inequality, we consider the distributional effects of government policies which
received less attention in this strand of literature. In order to simplify the cal-
culation and to obtain analytical results, we consider only proportional taxes,
instead of progressive taxes.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the
model. Section 3 discusses the steady state equilibrium. Section 4 examines
the dynamics and steady states of the distributions of wealth, income and
welfare. Section 5 presents the numerical results of the revenue-neutral tax
change and the taxation reform. Section 6 concludes.
1.2 The model
The basic framework with discrete time in this paper builds on the model of
Aghion, Akcigit, and Fernandez-Villaverde (2013), in which economic growth is
driven by technological progress resulting from intentional investment in R&D
that improves the quality of the intermediate inputs. Their model discusses
the optimal capital income tax and labor income tax, but not the effects
on the wealth and income distributions. By extending their model with the
6
assumption of heterogeneous agents with different initial capital endowments,
we discuss the distributional effects of the two taxes.
1.2.1 Households
Consider an economy populated with a mass of 1 infinitely lived households.
The individual household is indexed by i ∈ [0, 1]. Households are heteroge-
neous in the sense that they have different initial capital endowment Ki0. The
relative position of household i’s capital endowment is ki0 ≡ Ki0/K0, where K0
is the average capital endowment at time t = 0. Generally, the relative capital
stock at any instant kit ≡ Kit/Kt follows a distribution of G(kit) with the mean∫ 1
0
kitdi = 1, and the variance σ
2




The labor supply of the households is elastic. Each household has 1 unit
of time which can be allocated to leisure or to work. Denote lit as the leisure
consumed by the household. Then the labor supplied by the household is








where β is the rate of time preference, Cit is the consumption, lit is the leisure
time, η is the elasticity of leisure in utility, and γ is the coefficient of relative risk
aversion. Households own physical capital and the firms, and they also supply
labor to earn labor income. Thus, the household maximizes the discounted
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life-time utility subject to the following capital accumulation function:
Kit+1 = (1− τk)rtKit + (1− δ)Kit + (1− τl)wt(1− lit) + (1− τd)Dit−Cit (1.2)
where τk, τl, and τd stand for tax rates on capital income, labor income, and
firm profit, respectively. rt, wt and δ denote the rental rate of capital, wage rate
and depreciation rate, respectively. Dit stands for the firm profit household
i gets. We will see that the net firm profit is always equal to 0 from the
innovator’s problem below.
The first order conditions of the household are as follows:
βtCγ−1it l
ηγ
it = µit (1.3)
βtηCγitl
ηγ−1





(1− τk)rt+1 + 1− δ (1.5)






(Cit)Kit = 0 (1.6)
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In the economy, there is only one final good and a continuum of intermediate
goods indexed by j ∈ [0, 1]. The final firm produces under perfect competition
using physical capital and the continuum of intermediate goods. The interme-
diate goods are produced using labor by the producers who possess the most
advanced technologies. The progress of technologies is driven by innovations.
Final Good Producers
Final good can be used interchangeably for consumption, capital good or inno-
vation investment. Thus it serves as the numeraire. The production function













where zjt is the demand for intermediate good j to produce the intermediate
goods basket. Both Yt and Zt are produced under perfect competition.
Because final good production is competitive, the prices of the inputs






pjt = (1− α) Yt
zjt
(1.15)
where pjt denotes the price of the good j. Equation (1.13) implies the producer
of Zt will spend the same amount on each intermediate input j.
Intermediate Good Producers
Each intermediate input j is produced by a one-period-lived monopolist. That
is, the intermediate producer lives only for one period and it will be replaced
by another producer who successfully improved the productivity of the corre-
sponding product. This firm holds the patent to the most advanced technology.
Thus the production function of j is
zjt = qjtLjt (1.16)
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where Ljt is the labor demand by producer j and qjt is the labor productivity.





The intermediate good producer j faces a competitive fringe of imitators who
can produce the same product using the previous technology. The imitators
are unable to produce with the leading edge technology, thus the productivity
of the imitators are qjt−1. The production function of the imitators is




where λ is the step of the innovation, which indicates the size of the produc-
tivity improvement. We can see that qjt = λqjt−1. Thus, by Bertrand com-
petition, the producer of j can not set the price pjt higher than the marginal
cost of the imitators which is wtλ/qjt. That is, the price of good j should be





The equilibrium profit of the producer j is thus





(1− α)Yt = λ− 1
λ
(1− α)Yt (1.20)



































ln qjtdj is an aggregate productivity index. On the balanced
growth path where Kt
Zt
is constant, the wage rate will grow at the same rate as
the aggregate productivity.
Innovation
Innovations result from R&D investments. Successful innovators get monopo-
listic power to produce with the previous technologies. A potential innovator
in sector j need to invest xjtψQt to get a innovation rate of
xjt
x¯t
. x¯t is the
innovation intensity of the potential innovators. Qt appears here to show that
the difficulty of doing innovation and the required R&D investment is increas-
ing along with the productivity growth. That is, as technology progresses,










In a symmetric equilibrium, we can have








The equilibrium growth rate is then
Qt+1
Qt








The total innovation expenditure is




Total innovation expenditure equals total profit of the intermediate producers.
The net return to the household Dit is then zero.
1.2.3 Government
Government collects tax revenue from capital income and labor income to
finance the government expenditure which is a constant proportion of final
output. Thus, the balanced budget constraint of the government is
Gt = G0Yt = τkrtKt + τlwtLt (1.29)
The aggregate resource constraint of the economy is then
Kt+1 = Yt + (1− δ)Kt − Ct −Xt −Gt (1.30)
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1.3 Equilibrium
The macroeconomic equilibrium can be defined as following:
Definition 1. The equilibrium is an allocation {Cit, Kit, lit, Lt, Yt, Qt, Dt,Πt, Xt}∞t=0
and the market prices {rt, wt}∞t=0 such that:
(1) given prices and the initial capital distribution G(Ki0), the household
maximizes the expected lifetime utility; {(1.2)-(1.6)}
(2) given rt and wt, firms maximize profit by choosing price and production;
{(1.14), (1.24), and (1.27)}
(3) the government policies satisfy the balanced budget; {(1.29)}
(4) markets clear and aggregate resource constraint satisfied. {(1.30) and∫ 1
0
litdi = 1− Lt,
∫ 1
0
Ditdi = Πt −Xt}
The balanced growth path can be defined as following:
Definition 2. The balanced growth path is a dynamic equilibrium where
{rt, Lt} are constants and the aggregate variables {Ct, Yt, Kt, Qt} grows at the
same constant rate g.















































Gt = τkrtKt + τlwtLt + τdDt (1.38)





To facilitate the computational exercise, we can convert the above equi-
librium conditions to a system of technology-adjusted variables. Assume Jt
is an arbitrary variable. Then denote the technology-adjusted variable by















(1− τk)rt+1 + 1− δ (1.42)








































On a BGP, the labor and leisure are both constant. Suppose rt = r
∗,
Lt = L


















1−G0 − λ− 1
λ





































where φ1(g) ≡ (1−α)(1−τl)[(δ−1)β+g1−γ] and φ2(g) ≡ [(δ−1)β+g1−γ][(1−
τl)(1− α) + λη(1−G0 − λ−1λ (1− α))]− ληαβ(1− τk)(g + δ − 1).
The equilibrium of the economy is the same as that in Garcia-Penalosa
and Turnovsky (2007) in the sense that the aggregate behavior is independent
of wealth and income distributions. However, the growth rate in our model is
16
determined endogenously by productivity growth that results from intentional
R&D activity as in Aghion, Akcigit and Fernandez-Villaverde (2012).
1.4 Distributions
1.4.1 Relative Capital Distribution
In the above section, we already denoted the relative capital position by kit ≡
Kit
Kt
. Summing over the individual capital accumulation function (1.2), we can
get the aggregate capital accumulation function:
Kt+1 = (1− τk)rtKt + (1− δ)Kt + (1− τl)wtLt − Ct (1.53)
Together with (1.31), we have
Kt+1
Kt





(η + 1)Lt − 1
]
(1.54)









(η + 1)Lit − 1
]
(1.55)







. Thus, the evolution of




(1− τk)rt + 1− δ + 1−τlη wtKit [(η + 1)Lit − 1]
(1− τk)rt + 1− δ + 1−τlη wtKt [(η + 1)Lt − 1]
(1.56)
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On the balanced growth path, the relative capital position of household i is
constant, i.e. kit+1 = kit = k
∗
i . Thus, we can find the relationship between the








1− (1 + η)L∗] (1.57)
The household transversality condition implies the following aggregate transver-





(Ct)Kt = 0 (1.58)
It is then obvious that
βt+1Cγ−1t+1 Kt+1
βtCγ−1t Kt
< 1. Thus, Kt+1
Kt
< (1− τk)rt + 1− δ. From
(1.54), we can see the aggregate transversality condition is equivalent to
(1 + η)L∗ < 1 (1.59)
It also holds for each individual i, (1 + η)L∗i < 1. Then from equation (1.57),
there is a positive correlation between relative capital position and leisure time
on the balanced growth path.
Equation (1.55) shows the evolution of the capital stock of household i.
From the dynamics of the aggregate variables, it is straightforward to derive
the evolution of the relative capital positions. Suppose the initial capital of
household i is Ki0. The capital stock at time t can be solved by iterative
18












(η + 1)Lit − 1
]
(1.60)




. It implies that
lit = vilt and vi is constant over time. In other words, household i’s relative
leisure time is constant over time. According to (1.57),
vi =
η
(1 + η)(1− L∗) +
1− (1 + η)L∗
(1 + η)(1− L∗)K˜∗ K˜
∗
i (1.61)


















(η + 1)(1 − vi(1 − Lm)) − 1
]
. On
the balanced growth path, individual capital stock should be constant. Let













Since we have already got the dynamics of the aggregate variables, it is straight-
forward to get the dynamics of individual capital stock from equation (1.62)
and (1.63).
Substitute (1.61) into (1.63), we get
K˜it = Γt
{



















. In the long run,
K˜∗i = K˜i0
Γ∞
1 + Γ∞ ·Ψ∞ +
Γ∞ ·∆∞
1 + Γ∞ ·Ψ∞ (1.65)






1 + Γ∞ ·Ψ∞
]
−Ψt · Γ∞ ·∆∞
1 + Γ∞ ·Ψ∞ + ∆t
}
(1.66)
The law of motion of the relative capital stock K˜it can also be described
by (1.60) since (1.61) gives us vi. This is an equivalent way to describe the
path of K˜it. Moreover, we can see from the above equation that the relative
capital ranking of the households will be unchanged across time. Household
with a higher initial relative capital position will always have a higher relative
capital position.
According to (1.65), the standard deviation of relative capital position in





1 + Γ∞ ·Ψ∞σki0 (1.67)
We can also derive the standard deviation of relative capital position at any
period,
σkit = Θtσki0 (1.68)




In the neoclassical or AK model, there is no transitional dynamics. There-
fore, the steady state relative capital position is the same as the initial value.
In contrast, our model has incorporated the transitional dynamics of the rel-
ative capital position.
1.4.2 Relative Income Distribution
Distribution of Before-Tax Relative Income
The household i with capital stock Kit obtains before-tax income Fit = rtKit+
wtLit. The aggregate before-tax income of all households is Ft = rtKt +wtLt.
The relative income is denoted by fit ≡ Fit/Ft. On the balanced growth path,
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f ∗i − 1 = ρ(L∗)(k∗i − 1) (1.72)
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where ρ(L∗) ≡ 1− 1−α
(λα+1−α)(1+η)L∗ .
Claim 1. In the laissez-faire economy, 0 < ρ(L∗) < 1.
Proof It is obvious that ρ(L∗) < 1. Next, we show that ρ(L∗) > 0. Suppose
the growth rate is strictly positive on the balanced growth path, i.e. g > 1.
From aggregate capital accumulation function (1.53),
















(λα + 1− α)(1 + η)L∗ − (1− α) > 0
Therefore, 0 < ρ(L∗) < 1.
According to (1.72), household with higher wealth also obtains higher rela-
tive income. Also, we have the standard deviation of relative income σf∗i < σk∗i .
On the balanced growth path, the income inequality is smaller than the wealth
inequality.
The dynamics of income inequality can be obtained similarly to that of the











rtK˜it + w˜t − w˜t(1− Lt)vi
(α + (1− α)/λ)Y˜t
(1.74)
Substitute (1.61) (1.65) (1.66) to the above equation, we can obtain the stan-




(α + (1− α)/λ)Y˜t
− w˜t(1− Lt)(1− (η + 1)L
∗)
(α + (1− α)/λ)Y˜t(1 + η)(1− L∗)K˜∗
Γ∞ · K˜0
1 + Γ∞ ·Ψ∞
}
σki0 (1.75)
Especially, the standard deviation of the relative income in the long run is
σf∗i = ρ(L
∗)Θ∞σki0 (1.76)
The transitional dynamics affect the income inequality measure through
its effect on the steady state relative capital position.
Distribution of Relative After-tax Income
After-tax individual income can be defined as Fˆit = (1−τk)rtKit+(1−τl)wtLit.
The aggregate after-tax income is Fˆt = (1 − τk)rtKt + (1 − τl)wtLt. Denote
fˆit = Fˆit/Fˆt. On the balanced growth path, we can get similar results as above.
fˆ ∗i =
1
(1− τk)λα + (1− τl)(1− α)
[
(λα(1− τk) + (1− τl)(1− α)
(1 + η)L∗






fˆ ∗i − 1 = ρˆ(L∗)(k∗i − 1) (1.78)
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where ρˆ(L∗) ≡ 1− (1−τl)(1−α)
((1−τk)λα+(1−τl)(1−α))(1+η)L∗ .
Claim 2. 0 < ρˆ(L∗) < 1
Proof It is obvious that ρˆ(L∗) < 1. Next, we show that ρˆ(L∗) > 0. Suppose
the growth rate is strictly positive on the balanced growth path, g > 1. From
aggregate capital accumulation function (1.53),
g − 1 = (1− τk)r∗ − δ + (1− τl)w˜∗ L
∗
K˜∗








[(1 + η)L∗ − 1]r∗ > 0
Thus,
[λα(1− τk) + (1− τl)(1− α)](1 + η)L∗ − (1− τl)(1− α) > 0
Therefore, 0 < ρˆ(L∗) < 1.
We can see that after-tax relative income is higher for wealthier household.
Also, we have the standard deviation of relative income σfˆ∗i
< σk∗i . The after-
tax relative income inequality is also smaller than the wealth inequality on the
balanced growth path.
According to the above results, both before and after tax relative income
are increasing in relative capital position. It implies that although the richer
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individuals supply less labor and obtain lower labor income, the effect is not
strong enough to offset the higher capital income. More intuitively, it is
straightforward to see that σL∗i = (L
∗ − 1
1+η
)σk∗i from (1.57). According to
(1.59), the variability of labor supply is smaller than the variability of relative
capital position.
From the expression of ρˆ(L∗), we can have
ρˆ(L∗) = ρ(L∗) + (1− ρ(L∗)) λα(τl − τk)
(1− τk)λα + (1− τl)(1− α) (1.79)
Thus, for the same equilibrium capital variation, the variation of pre-tax in-
come is higher than post-tax income variation if and only if τk > τl. The









1− ρ(L∗) + (1− ρ(L
∗))
−λα(1− τl)(λα + 1− α)










1− ρ(L∗) + (1− ρ(L
∗))
λα(1− τk)(λα + 1− α)
[(1− τk)λα + (1− τl)(1− α)]2
(1.81)
Both income taxes τl and τk have direct and indirect effects on the after-
tax income distribution. Firstly, taxes can directly affect the after-tax income
variations which is implied by the second terms of the right hand side of the
above two derivatives. From the derivatives, it is easy to see that capital
income tax has a negative direct effect on after-tax income variation, while
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the effect of labor income tax is positive. Secondly, taxes can affect the after-
tax income through their effects on the equilibrium labor supply and further
the before-tax income. This is implied by the first term of the right hand side
of the derivatives.
The dynamics of after-tax income inequality can be obtained similarly to
that of the wealth inequality. The relative income of individual i is
fˆit =
(1− τk)rtKit + (1− τl)wtLit
(1− τk)rtKt + (1− τl)wtLt (1.82)
We can obtain the standard deviation of the after-tax relative income σfˆit :
σfˆit =
1




−(1− τl)w˜t(1− Lt)(1− (η + 1)L
∗)
Y˜t(1 + η)(1− L∗)K˜∗
Γ∞ · K˜0
1 + Γ∞ ·Ψ∞ )
}
σki0 (1.83)
In the long run, the standard deviation of the relative after-tax income is
σfˆ∗i
= ρˆ(L∗)Θ∞σki0 (1.84)
1.4.3 Distribution of Welfare
The individual welfare equals the individual utility function (1.1) evaluated

































)γ = v(1+η)γi (1.86)
The second equality comes from the fact that lit = vilt. Note that vi is time-
invariant. We can express a monotonic transformation of the relative welfare
of individual i in terms of the relative capital position of individual i,
$
1/(1+η)γ
i = vi =
η
(1 + η)(1− L∗) +
1− (1 + η)L∗
(1 + η)(1− L∗)k
∗
i (1.87)
A natural measure of welfare inequality is then the standard deviation of the
relative utility
σ$i =
1− (1 + η)L∗
(1 + η)(1− L∗)σk∗i =
1− (1 + η)L∗




1 + Γ∞ ·Ψ∞σki0 (1.88)
Comparing with the income inequality, we can show that σ$i < σf∗i and
σ$i < σfˆ∗i
. The welfare inequality is smaller than both the before-tax and
after-tax income inequality, thus also smaller than wealth inequality on the
balanced growth path.
We summarize some of the results in the following proposition:
Proposition 1. On the balanced growth path,
1. both before-tax and after-tax income inequalities are smaller than the
wealth inequality;
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2. the before-tax income inequality is higher than the after-tax income
inequality if and only if the capital income tax rate is larger than the labor
income tax rate;
3. welfare inequality is smaller than before-tax and after-tax income in-
equalities, thus also smaller than wealth inequality.
1.5 Numerical Analysis
To study the dynamics of inequality measures and the effects of fiscal policy,
we apply the numerical analysis in this section. The system of equations (1.41)
-(1.47) forms a typical two-point boundary value problem in discrete time. We
adopt the tool provided by Trimborn et al (2008) to solve this problem. The
tool in Trimborn et al (2008) is only applicable to the continuous models, so
we modified the codes and extended it to discrete models.
Our choice of γ = −0.8 indicates that the inter-temporal elasticity of sub-
stitution is 0.5556. It is well in the range used in existing literature. The
elasticity of leisure in the utility η is 2.1, which implies that agents spent
70 percent of their discretionary time on leisure. β equals to 0.998 delivers
an annual after-tax interest rate of 4.9%. The depreciation rate δ is 0.05.
α = 0.28 and λ = 1.08 implies that the labor share of output is about two
thirds. ψ = 0.067 gives an equilibrium growth rate of about 2.6 percent.
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Parameter γ η β δ α λ ψ G0
Value −0.8 2.1 0.998 0.05 0.28 1.08 0.067 0.2367
Table 1.1: Baseline parameter values
variable g∗ L∗ K˜∗ C˜∗ Y˜ ∗ w˜∗ r∗
steady-state 1.0258 0.3024 0.8592 0.2225 0.4051 0.8931 0.1320
Table 1.2: Steady-state values of variables
In our benchmark model, we assume a base income tax rate of 0.25. Thus,
τk = τl = 0.25 in the benchmark case. In order to keep the government budget
balanced at every period, the following equation must hold:




It then implies a government spending share of G0 = 0.2367. Table (1.1)
summarizes the benchmark parameter values.
Table (1.2) shows the steady state values of the model.
r∗ represents the rental rate, and r∗ = 0.1320 implies 4.9% of after-tax
interest rate.
In the following sections, we will examine the effects of taxation on growth
and several inequality measures by beginning with negative capital income tax
and gradually increasing capital income tax to 0.7. Negative capital income
tax should be regarded as subsidy to capital. Therefore, the labor income tax
will decrease from a high level accordingly.
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Figure 1.1: Dynamics of aggregate variables
1.5.1 Aggregate and Distributional Dynamics
Suppose the initial aggregate capital endowment is 0.07, which is lower than
all of the steady state capital levels under the tax rates we are going to study
below. We have the aggregate dynamics as shown in Figure (1.1).
Starting from a level lower than the steady state, the capital stock will in-
crease over time. Meanwhile, the equilibrium labor supply will decrease. The
price of capital rt and the price of labor Wt will evolve towards the opposite
direction to that of capital stock and labor supply, respectively. Output, con-
sumption and growth rate will all increase until they reach the steady state
values.
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Figure 1.2: Dynamics of wealth inequality
The distribution of the economy can be described by Figure (1.2) and (1.3).
Along with the increase of capital stock, the average level of labor supply
is decreasing. The labor supply of individuals with initial capital both lower
than (the poor) and higher than (the rich) the average level will decrease.
From the first order condition of the households, the individuals will keep the
relative leisure level constant over time. The relative labor supply of the rich
will decrease when the average labor supply decreases. On the contrary, the




+ vi.) In another





, the relative consumptions of all individuals are constant
over time. The relative saving of the poor will increase and that of the rich
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Figure 1.3: Dynamics of income inequality
will decrease. The relative capital position of the rich will decrease while the
relative capital position of the poor will increase. Therefore, the standard
deviation of the relative capital position (wealth inequality) is decreasing over
time.
The income of the household includes two parts: capital income and labor
income. The relative capital income of individuals with lower initial capital
will increase and that of the rich will decrease, because the relative capital of
the poor increases. The relative labor income of the poor also will increase as
the relative labor supply of the poor is increasing.
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Figure 1.4: Capital income tax and key variables
1.5.2 Revenue Neutral Taxation Effects
The following Figure (1.4) shows the steady state growth rates as well as other
main variables under different tax rates.
Figure (1.4) shows the effect of taxation on the aggregate economy. We
can see that a higher capital income tax leads to a lower steady state growth
rate. This is consistent with the conventional wisdom that capital income
tax reduces capital accumulation and investment
(
e.g. Chamley (1986) and
Lucas (1990)
)
. In the Schumpeterian model, it will also hurt the demand for
intermediate goods and thus the incentive to innovate, which is the source of
economic growth in this model. A higher capital income tax (a lower labor
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income tax) will lead to a lower steady state capital level and a higher labor
supply level. This is to say that the direct effect from lower incentive to
accumulate outweighs the effect from higher return to capital. The effect on
consumption is more complicated. When capital income tax is low, increasing
capital income tax can increase consumption, because marginal utility gain
from consumption is greater than that of accumulation. However, it will reduce
consumption to increase capital income tax, if the capital income tax is already
at a high level. That is to say there is a ”golden rule” capital income tax that
maximizes consumption.
We normalize the standard deviation of the initial relative capital position
to 1, i.e. σki0 = 1. Under different tax rates, the following Figure (1.5) and
Figure (1.6) show the effects of taxation on different inequality measures.
Figure (1.7) shows the effects of taxation on different components of the
before and after tax incomes of the household, i.e. capital income r∗K and
labor income w∗L.
The figure shows that higher capital income tax will lead to higher before-
tax income inequality but lower after-tax income inequality and welfare in-
equality. As to the wealth inequality, when initial capital income tax is small,
increasing capital income tax will decrease wealth inequality. However, if ini-
tial capital income tax is already high enough, increasing capital income tax
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Figure 1.5: Capital income tax and inequality measures
Figure 1.6: Labor income tax and inequality measures
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Figure 1.7: Capital income tax and income shares
will lead to higher wealth inequality. We then have the following results:
Result 1. On the balanced growth path,
1. Consumption is an inverse-U shape function of the capital income tax.
2. Growth rate is decreasing in the capital income tax.
3. There is a capital income tax that minimizes wealth inequality.
4. After-tax income inequality and welfare inequality are decreasing in
capital income tax, while before-tax income inequality is increasing.
The result regarding the growth rate is consistent with Aghion et al (2013).
Consistent with Garcia-Penalosa and Turnovsky (2007), after tax income in-
equality and welfare inequality are decreasing in capital income tax. However,
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in their paper, the effects on wealth inequality can not be analyzed, because
the economy is always on the balanced growth path and there is no transitional
dynamics.
When the capital income tax is low, increasing capital income tax will
reduce wealth inequality, after-tax income inequality and welfare inequality.
At the same time, growth rate will be reduced by increasing capital income tax.
Government faces the conventional trade-off between growth and inequality.
When the capital income tax is high, this trade-off between growth and after-
tax income inequality and welfare inequality remains. However, in this case,
it is possible for the government to reduce wealth inequality and enhance
economic growth at the same time by reducing the capital income tax.
1.5.3 Taxation Reform
In this section, we will consider the following cases when the economy transit
from lump-sum tax financed government spending to labor income tax or cap-
ital income tax financed government spending. We will analyze the impacts of
this tax transformation on the inequality measures. Here, however, we assume
the share of government expenditure is 0.1 to avoid an unrealistically high cap-
ital income tax or labor income tax. To avoid the direct distribution effects
of lump-sum tax, we assume that Tit/Tt = Kit/Kt, where Tit is the lump sum
tax of agent i, Tt ≡
∫ 1
0
Titdi is the aggregate lump sum tax. We also assume
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variable g∗ L∗ K˜∗ C˜∗ Y˜ ∗ w˜∗ r∗
steady-state 1.0307 0.3324 1.2485 0.3070 0.4815 0.9657 0.1080
Table 1.3: Initial steady-state values of variables
Figure 1.8: Transiting from lump sum financing to capital income tax financing
initially the economy is in the steady state, which is reported in Table (1.3).
Firstly, we consider the case when lump sum tax financing switching to
capital income tax financing. The capital income tax increases from 0 to
0.3571. From the following Figure (1.8), the increase of capital income tax
leads to a rise in the wealth inequality. The before-tax and after-tax income
inequality both have an initial downward adjustment followed by a gradual
increase which finally lead to a bit higher inequality than that of the lump
sum tax financing. Welfare inequality also increases.
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Figure 1.9: Transiting from lump sum financing to labor income tax financing
When switching from lump sum tax financing to labor income tax financ-
ing, wealth inequality will increase gradually, similar to the above case. Before-
tax income inequality and after-tax income inequality, however, have different
pattern of changes. Before-tax income inequality experiences a downward ini-
tial adjustment while after-tax income inequality experiences an upward initial
adjustment. After the initial adjustments, they both increase towards the new
steady state, but the increases are relatively small compare to the initial ad-
justments. Welfare inequality also increases.
We can summarize the results as follows:
Result 2. On the balanced growth path,
1. Capital income tax financing results in a larger dynamic adjustment of
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inequality.
2. Compare to labor income tax financing, capital income tax financing
leads to higher wealth inequality and before-tax income inequality, but lower
after-tax income inequality and welfare inequality.
3. Capital income tax financing leads to a lower growth rate and steady
state capital stock.
The above results are largely consistent with Garcia-Penalosa and Turnovsky
(2011). The result that capital income tax financing results in lower growth
rate is consistent with Garcia-Penalosa and Turnovsky (2007) and Aghion et
al (2013). It is in line with Garcia-Penalosa and Turnovsky (2007) that capi-




If we assume λ = 1, the model becomes a neoclassical model with zero growth
rate. The effects of taxes on the several inequality measures are reported in
Figure (1.10):
The effects of taxes on inequality measures are almost the same as the
endogenous growth case with slightly different magnitude.
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Figure 1.10: Capital income tax and inequality measures in neoclassical case
Sensitivity check of parameters
To check whether our results are dependent on the chosen set of parameters,
we do several sensitivity checks for all the main parameters of the model. The
following figures show that the patterns of the effects of taxation on inequality
measures are robust to different parameter values.
We show the changes of inequality measures when γ changes from -0.2
to -1.4. From Figure (1.14), we can see that all the four inequalities are
decreasing in γ. Increase of γ indicates an increase of inter-temporal elasticity
of substitution. The result is contrary to Garcia-Penalosa and Turnovsky
(2006), in which increasing inter temporal elasticity of substitution leads to
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Figure 1.11: Labor income tax and inequality measures in neoclassical case
Figure 1.12: Capital income tax and key macro variables in the neoclassical
case
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Figure 1.13: Capital income tax and income components in the neoclassical
case
higher income inequality, due to the presence of transitional dynamics.
We show in Figure 1.15 the change of η from 1.5 to 2.7. The above graph
shows that capital and before-tax income inequality are increasing in η while
welfare inequality is decreasing in η. However, all the changes in the inequality
measures are relatively small.
We allow β to change from 0.95 to 0.998. Capital inequality and welfare
inequality are decreasing in β. After-tax income inequality is increasing in
β. Before-tax income inequality is increasing in β when τk is small, but it is
decreasing in β when τk is large enough.
When δ increases from 0.02 to 0.08, capital inequality, before-tax and after-
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Figure 1.14: Variations in γ and inequality measures
Figure 1.15: Variations in η and inequality measures
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Figure 1.16: Variations in β and inequality measures
Figure 1.17: Variations in δ and inequality measures
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tax inequality all increase. Only welfare inequality decreases when δ decreases.
See Figure 1.17.
Figure 1.18: Variations in α and inequality measures
Figure 1.18 shows that when α increases from 0.22 to 0.34, the four in-
equality measures all increase.
We also show in Figure 1.19 that when λ increases from 1.02 to 1.14, all
the four inequality measures increase.
When φ increases from 0.037 to 0.097, all the inequalities decreases. See
Figure 1.20.
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Figure 1.19: Variations in λ and inequality measures
Figure 1.20: Variations in φ and inequality measures
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1.6 Conclusion
This chapter investigates the distributional roles of different taxations. We
construct a Schumpeterian growth model with heterogeneous households. The
only heterogeneity comes from different initial capital endowments. We show
that the steady state inequality depends on the transitional dynamics of the
economy as well as the initial inequality. By analyzing both the transitional
dynamics and the steady state effects of the taxes, we conclude that there is
a capital income tax that minimizes wealth inequality. Thus, it is possible for
the government to reduce wealth inequality and enhance growth at the same
time by reducing the capital income tax from a relatively high level. Before-tax
income inequality is increasing in the capital income tax, while both after-tax
income inequality and welfare inequality are decreasing in the capital income
tax.
We also examine the reform from a lump-sum tax to a capital income tax
or a labor income tax. We show that capital income tax financing results
in a larger dynamic adjustment of inequality. Compare to labor income tax
financing, capital income tax financing leads to higher wealth inequality and
before-tax income inequality, but lower after-tax income inequality and welfare
inequality. Moreover, capital income tax financing leads to a lower growth rate
and a lower level of steady state capital stock.
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Chapter 2
Patent Length in an
Endogenous Growth Model with
Innovation and Standardization
2.1 Introduction
When a new product is first introduced, the production technology of that
product is usually complex and thus the production cost is high. With the
widespread adoption and acceptance of the technology and the product, re-
spectively, a secondary innovation targeting on the high-cost products will
emerge. Successful secondary innovations can reduce the complexity of the
technology and the production cost is then lowered. We call this secondary
innovation as ”Standardization”. On the one hand, the standardization pro-
cess destroys the monopoly profits of the high-cost goods producers and thus
lowers the innovation incentive. On the other hand, it expands the output by
lowering production cost. Thus, standardization is both an engine of economic
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growth and a barrier to it.
In this chapter, we examine the optimal combination of patent length for in-
novation and standardization. Patent protection policy is one commonly used
instrument for the government to balance the dynamic gain and the static loss
from monopoly power of the innovators in production. Without patent protec-
tion, innovation can not be compensated and there will be no incentive to do
innovation. However, with permanent patent protection, monopolistic price
above marginal cost discourages aggregate demand for goods and services.
With two types of innovations, monopolistic pricing also hinders the speed of
technology diffusion from high cost production to low cost production. With
both innovation and standardization in the economy, patent length for inno-
vation and standardization may have different effects on economic growth as
well as social welfare.
Although the distinctions between innovation and standardization are not
always clear enough for the policy makers to apply different patent length
protections, Acemoglu, Garcia and Zilibotti (2012) listed many examples on
the differences between innovation and standardization. Among the examples
cited is the production of transistors. Bell Laboratories initiated the intro-
duction of this new product in 1947. However, this process required skill
manual work and the production technology was complex. In 1959, a newly
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founded company Fairchild Semiconductor introduced the planar transistor
which became the first industry standard. This secondary innovation replaced
the irregular surface of the transistors with flat surface, which significantly
reduced the production cost and complexity of production. The differences
between innovation and standardization are also quite similar to that between
innovation and imitation in the literature. The difference is that standardiza-
tion requires R&D inputs and the production technology is changed. Basically,
the R&D activities that introduces newly emerged varieties or industries can
be categorized as innovation; the R&D activities that lower the technology
complexity and production cost of the existing product should be regarded as
standardization.
There are numerous studies on the optimal patent length to balance the
conflicting interests between innovation incentive and market efficiency. Ear-
lier studies adopted models with no economic growth or exogenous growth rate.
For example, Nordhaus (1969), Sherer (1972), Gilbert and Shapiro (1990),
Judd (1985). Gilbert and Shapiro (1990) consider both patent length and
patent breadth. They show that the optimal patent length can be infinite with
patent breadth adjustments. On his seminal paper, Judd (1985) shows that
infinite patent length is optimal with an exogenous growth model. More recent
papers discuss the patent policy under endogenous growth models. Horowitz
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and Lai (1996) consider the issue with a quality ladder model and they show
that the optimal patent length that maximizes welfare is finite and lower than
patent that maximizes rate of innovation. Kwan and Lai (2003), Futagami
and Iwaisako (2007) also find that the patent length that maximizes welfare is
finite based on variety expansion models. Zeng, Zhang and Fung (2014) study
the combination of price regulation and patent length instruments in a variety
expansion model too. They also find that welfare maximizing patent length
is finite. The literature only considers one type of innovation in the model.
However, the implications of patent policy will be different when there are two
types of innovation.
In essence, patent length affects growth rate and social welfare through its
impact on resource allocation among different economic activities: high cost
and low cost monopoly production, competitive production, R&D input to
innovation and R&D input to standardization. Patent length for innovation
affects the return to innovation and the pace of technology diffusion to low
cost production. Patent length for standardization affects the return to stan-
dardization. We show that given patent lengths, the equilibrium may fall in
three regimes: one with both innovation and standardization; one with only
innovation; and one with no innovation. Firstly, when patent for innovation is
too long, there will be only innovation at equilibrium, because standardization
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is always less profitable than innovation. Secondly, when patent for standard-
ization is too long, there might be no innovation, because return to innovation
might be always less than standardization. Thirdly, we find that the optimal
combination of patent lengths that maximizes welfare should fall in regime
with both innovation and standardization. Optimal patent for innovation is
finite. The reason is that there will be no standardization at equilibrium if
patent length for innovation is too long. Therefore, the economy is unable to
reap the benefit of an increase in output resulting from secondary innovation
that lowers production cost. The optimal patent for standardization should
also be finite not only because of the possible poverty trap, but also because
of the static loss from lowering consumption.
Furthermore, when there are both innovation and standardization at equi-
librium, only patent length for standardization can affect growth rate. That is
also a result of free entry that equalizes return to innovation and standardiza-
tion. Patent length for innovation will not affect growth rate, because arrival
rate of standardization will adjust to make return to innovation equals to the
return to standardization which only depends on patent length for standard-
ization.
Different from Acemoglu, Garcia and Zilibotti (2012), in which standard-
ization shifts production input from skilled labor to unskilled labor, our setup
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of standardization here assumes that standardization reduces production cost.
This assumption brings our standardization process closer to the cost reduction
innovation. Therefore, our model combines the variety expansion innovation
with cost reduction innovation. Acemoglu (2009) shows that cost reduction
innovation and quality improving innovation are essentially equivalent in the
context of typical growth models. 1
Extending our model to an open economy setup by assuming the North
does innovation and the South does standardization, our paper is also related
to another literature on intellectual property rights (IPR) policy in North-
South trade and worldwide technology diffusion models. Helpman (1993) find
that tighter IPR policy in the South would hurt the South in terms of trade
and with endogenous innovation rate, stronger IPR policy will generate an ini-
tial increase and following decrease in innovation rate. Glass and Saggi (2002),
however, show that stronger IPR makes multinationals more secure from im-
itation but reduces FDI and innovation. On the contrary, Lai (1998) and
Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2010) argue that stronger IPR protection in the
South causes an increase in FDI and innovation. By studying the trade off be-
tween quality improvement innovation and variety expansion innovation, Glass
and Wu (2007) find that stronger IPR protection may shift innovation away
1For the survey of quality improving innovation literature, you can refer to Aghion and
Howitt (2009).
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from quality improving innovation to variety expansion innovation. In this
chapter, stronger patent protection for standardization will definitely lead to
an increase in innovation rate, because the returns to innovation and standard-
ization are equalized. However, our model is a closed economy model where
there is one central government which can choose a combination of patent
protection for innovation and for standardization, while it is not possible in
the North-South trade models as there are separate governments.
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2, we construct the basic
model with two types of innovation. Section 3 analyzes the steady state equi-
librium of the model and the effects of patent length on welfare and economic
growth. Section 4 shows that numerical analysis based on the model in Section
2. Section 5 concludes.
2.2 Model Setup
We consider an closed economy in continuous time and admits a representative
household. The endogenous growth of the economy results from the expansion
of product varieties. Similar to Acemoglu, Garcia and Zilibotti (2012), the
innovation is followed by a costly process of standardization.
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2.2.1 Households
The continuum of households are infinitely lived with a mass of L. Each
household has one unit of time which is supplied inelastically to work. They
maximize the present discounted lifetime utility by choosing their consumption






1− γ dt (2.1)
whereCt is consumption expenditure, γ represents the elasticity of marginal
utility.
The budget constraint of the representative household is:
a˙t = wtL+ rtat − Ct (2.2)
where wt is the wage rate and rt is the interest rate. A dot above a variable
represents the change rate of that variable with respect to time.







According to the above equation, the growth rate then depends on rt which
also indicates the returns to the R&D investment.
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2.2.2 Firms
In the economy, there is only one final good which is produced with labor and
a continuum of intermediate products under perfect competition. There are
three types of intermediate producers. One produces monopolistic high cost
goods. Low tech goods are produced by two types of intermediate producers:
one is a monopoly, and the other is competitive. Same as Romer (1990),
economic growth comes from the increase of the total variety of intermediate
goods which is the result of intentional R&D activities.
Final firm
The final good is produced with labor and intermediate goods. Final good
can be used interchangeably for consumption, innovation and standardization






where L is the labor input to final good production, A is a constant scale
factor, xi is the demand for intermediate good i, and N is the number of all
intermediate products, a proxy for the technology level of the economy. As
in Romer (1990), N grows endogenously through purposeful innovation by
intermediate firms.
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Upon introduction, each intermediate product is a high cost good created
by innovation and produced from final good with an one to one technology.
We denote this type of intermediate product by xHi. The innovator then
enjoys a period of patent protection during which the innovator can produce
and obtain profit. After the innovation patent expires, the newly introduced
product may face with a costly standardization process. Once standardized,
the product can be produced by a less costly technology. The innovator of
the product then loses monopoly power and exits the market. We denote the
standardized good by xMi. The standardizer also enjoys a period of patent
protection. Immediately after the expiration of the standardization patent,
this good becomes competitive which we denote by xCi.
In sum, there are three types of intermediate goods that are used to produce
the final good. xHi is high cost good, while xMi and xCi are both low cost













where NH is the number of high-tech products, NM is the number of monop-
olistic low-tech goods and NC is the number of competitive low cost goods.
Suppose NL is the total number of low cost goods. Then NM +NC = NL. So
NH + NL = N . Because of perfect competition in final good production, the
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price of each intermediate input will be equal to its marginal product:
Pji = (1− α)ALαx−αji (2.6)
w = αY/L (2.7)
where w is the wage rate, Pji is the price of the intermediate good i and
j ∈ H,M,C.
Intermediate firms
The high cost intermediate goods are produced with an one to one production
technology using final good. The intermediate goods’ markets are monopolis-
tic competitive. Thus, intermediate producers of good i can obtain positive
profits. Hence the profit for a high cost intermediate good producer is:
piHi = PHixHi − xHi (2.8)
According to (2.6), we can have






The low-cost intermediate goods are produced with a lower cost in terms of
final good. One unit of intermediate good is produced with ξ unit of final good
59
where 0 < ξ < 1. Thus, the profit that the monopolistic low cost intermediate
goods producers can obtain is:
piMi = PMixMi − ξxMi (2.11)








Here, we can see that the output of low cost production xM is greater than
that of the high cost production xH . The low cost production also offers the
monopolist a larger profit.
The competitive low cost goods producers make zero profit. Therefore, the
price of the competitive low cost goods is equal to its marginal cost:
PCi = ξ (2.14)
Together with (2.6), we have:
xCi = ξ
−1/α(1− α)1/αA1/αL (2.15)
Comparing the expression for xHi, xMi and xCi, we can see that xMi > xHi.
The input and output of monopolistic low cost goods production are larger
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than that of high cost goods production. This results from the lower marginal
cost of low cost goods production. In addition, we can have xCi > xMi. It
means the input and output of monopolistic production are less than that of
competitive production. This results from the presence of monopoly power.
2.2.3 Innovation and Standardization
We assume that both innovation and standardization are costly activities.
Upon introduction, the intermediate good producer will have a period of patent
protection with length TH , when producing that product. Within the patented
period, the product is not allowed to be standardized. When the patent ex-
pires, the product is available for a costly secondary innovation which we call
standardization. After standardization, the standardizer of that product will
enjoy a patent length of TL to produce it.
One possible conjecture is that unlike the above assumption that the new
product is not allowed to be standardized by anyone within the patented pe-
riod, the producer of a certain product can implement the cost reduction in-
novation upon their own product at any time. However, when the profit from
standardized product is not large enough to cover both the standardization
cost and the loss from the destruction of the patent for innovation, the pro-
ducer will have no incentive to do standardization within the patented period.
We will derive the condition on the low cost monopolistic profit that exclude
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this possibility in next section.
After the patent for innovation expires, it is also not beneficial for a pro-
ducer to standardize its own product due to the usual ”Arrow effect”. The
value of a standardization to the incumbent is strictly less than the value to
an outsider, because the incumbent has to bear the loss from current profit
flow of high cost production.
Define VH and VL as the present discounted value of an innovation and
standardization, respectively. The value of an innovation consists of two com-
ponents: the value before the patent expiring date and the value after the
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The first term on the right-hand side of equation (2.16) is the expression for
the discounted value of an innovation before the patent expires. There is no
uncertainty regarding the profit flow that the monopoly firm can obtain in
this period. The second expression on the right-hand side of equation (2.16)
indicates the value of the innovation after the patent expires. That is, the
discounted profit flow weighted by the probability that the product has not
been standardized. m is the standardization rate which will be discussed in
next section. The value in the second period can also be determined from
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the following condition which is similar to the standard no arbitrage condition
from Aghion and Howitt (1992):
rVA = piH + V˙A −mVA (2.17)
where VA is the value of innovation after the expiration of the patent. The
instantaneous profit plus capital gain minus the expected loss of monopoly
power from standardization should be equal to the risk free return from lending
the value of innovation to the capital market.
Furthermore, we assume the cost of introducing a new product is µH . The
free entry to innovation drives the net profit of innovation to zero:
VH ≤ µH (2.18)







Thus, in steady state, we have:
VL = (1− e−rTL)piM/r (2.20)
The free entry in standardization also drives the net gain from standardization
down to zero:
VL ≤ µL (2.21)
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The aggregate resource constraint of the economy is then:
Y = C + N˙µH + N˙LµL +NH(1− α)2/αA1/αL+
NM(1− α)2/αξ(α−1)/αA1/αL+NC(1− α)1/αξ(α−1)/αA1/αL (2.22)
The second and the third terms on the right are the investments on innovation
and standardization, respectively. The last three terms on the right are the
production inputs of final good to the high cost intermediate goods and the
low cost intermediate goods.
2.3 Steady State Equilibrium
In the steady state equilibrium, consumption, final output and the number of
variety grow at the same rate g, which is also the growth rate of the number







. It implies that the share of high cost goods n is a constant. It
is straightforward that the share of monopolized low cost goods NM
N
and the
share of competitive low cost goods NC
N
are also constant in steady state. Given




. Next we explain how to
determine them. Suppose the number of total low cost goods is N0 at time
0. At time t, it becomes NL. Since growth rate is g, we have N0e
gt = NL.
Thus, N0 = NLe
−gt. The number of competitive low cost goods is N0eg(t−TL)
and the number of monopolized low cost goods is NL−N0eg(t−TL). Therefore,
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NC = NLe
−gTL and NM = NL − NLe−gTL . The total share of low cost goods
is 1− n. Then NM
N
= (1− n)(1− e−gTL) and NC
N
= (1− n)e−gTL .
In the steady state equilibrium, the free entry conditions ensure that VH =
µH and VL = µL. Since µH and µL are constant, VH and VL are also constant.








The standardization rate is defined as m = N˙L
Ne−gTH−NL , where Ne
−gTH−NL











, together with the definition of m, we can solve
for n in terms of g and m
n = 1− m
m+ g
e−gTH (2.24)
The free entry condition of standardization determines the interest rate
1− e−rTL
r
piM = µL (2.25)







The above condition ensures that with positive growth rate, standardization
is profitable, thus there is positive standardization in the equilibrium.
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)piH = µH (2.27)
The standardization rate is then
m =
piH − rµH




piH < µH <
piH
r
, we can have m > 0. That is, there are both
positive innovation and standardization activities at equilibrium. However,
this condition may not always be satisfied at equilibrium. Different equilibria
may arise due to the violation of this condition as a result of different policy
choices (change of TH and TL). The following Figure (2.1) depicts the possible
equilibria. In essence, there could be three regimes, which will be discussed in
detail.
Proposition 1: The equilibria can be classified into three regimes and the
economy may fall into any of the three different regimes at steady state:
Regime 1: When (1−e
−rTH )
r
piH < µH <
piH
r
, both innovation and standard-
ization exist.
Regime 2: When µH ≤ 1−e−rTHr piH , there will be no standardization at
equilibrium.
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Figure 2.1: Possible Equilibria
Regime 3: When µH ≥ piHr , there will be no innovation and economic
growth. The economy stagnates.
Proof. From the expression of m, the standardization rate is:
m =
piH − rµH
µH − (1− e−rTH )piH/r
That means when (1−e
−rTH )
r
piH < µH <
piH
r
, we can have m > 0. Thus, for
any given combination of TH and TL, there is an equalized return to R&D
investment to both innovation and standardization.




is the value of innovation while m→∞. When v is always larger than µH , the
innovation value is always higher than its cost. All the R&D investment will be
reallocated to innovation. Thus, no one will do standardization at equilibrium.
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If µH ≥ piHr , the value of an innovation v ≡ piHr is always lower than its
cost µH . No resource will be allocated to innovation. In equilibrium, there will
be no innovation and nothing available for standardization. Q.E.D.
The three conditions above can be rewritten as the boundary conditions
for TH and TL. We will discuss these conditions in the following subsections.
Basically, the condition for Regime 2 requires TH to be large enough or TL to
be small enough. The condition for Regime 3 requires TL to be large enough.
Regime 3 may not always exist. When piM/µL < piH/µH , there will be both
innovation and standardization even if TL → ∞. We will elaborate it in the
following subsections.
One concern we want to discuss here is the possibility that the innovator
himself has the incentive to do the secondary innovation targeting on its own
product. By doing this, the innovator can obtain higher profit (piM > piH)
even before the patent for the innovation expires. If so, there is no chance for
other standardizers to do standardization. The model then degenerates to the
conventional growth model with one type of innovation. If the innovator does
standardization during the patent length TH , he would do it immediately after
the innovation of the new product to maximize profit. The value of innovation








In the steady state, V NH =
piM
r
[1− e−r(TH+TL)]. If the value of innovation with
standardization is smaller than the summation of the cost of innovation and the
cost of standardization, the innovators have no incentive to do standardization.
That requires the following condition:
piM
r
[1− e−r(TH+TL)] < µH + µL (2.30)
From the next section, we will see that with positive m, there is an upper
bound for TH in terms of TL: TH < T
∗







the expression of piM into the above inequality (2.30). Together with the fact











Thus, to exclude the uninteresting case when innovators do standardization,





This condition requires that the cost reduction should not be too large and
thus the profit of low cost production is not too large compare with that of high
cost production. This is a very weak condition that can be easily met. With
this condition, the innovators have no incentive to do standardization targeting
on their own product for all positive patent length for standardization.
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To transform the system into a stationary one, we define c ≡ C
N















According to the aggregate resource constraint (2.22), we can write c as:
c = y − µHg − µL(1− n)g − n(1− α)2/αA1/αL− (1− n)
ξ(α−1)/α(1− α)1/αA1/αL
[
(1− e−gTL)(1− α)1/α + e−gTL
]
(2.34)
Define the social welfare Γ as the lifetime utility of the representative house-
hold. We assume the economy starts from the steady state and the social










ρ− g(1− γ) −
1
ρ(1− γ) (2.35)
Next, we discuss the welfare and growth effects of patent protection in the
three regimes respectively.





piH < µH <
piH
r
, the standardization rate is positive. This
condition says that the innovation cost is lower than the value of innovation
2When γ = 1, the utility function becomes log utility. Therefore, the social welfare




with no standardization, while the innovation cost is larger than the value
of innovation with infinite standardization rate. Therefore, there is always
a positive standardization rate that equalizes innovation cost and innovation
benefit.
For a given patent length for standardization, there is an upper bound for
patent length for innovation T ∗H , beyond which the model degenerates to the








where r(TL) is the solution to equation (2.25) given TL. Thus,










From this equation, we can see that the upper bound of TH is a function of
TL. When TH = T
∗
H , the standardization rate goes to infinity. A high cost
good will be standardized immediately after its patent expires.
In summary, the conditions for the regime that both innovation and stan-























Next, we analyze the growth effects of the patent durations. According to
equation (2.25), longer patent length for standardization enhances the return
on standardization. Thus r is increasing in TL. The Euler equation (2.3)
from household maximization shows that g is increasing in r. Thus, within
this regime, longer TL increases growth rate g. Furthermore, according to the
Euler equation, g is independent of TH . It is interesting that the return on
standardization is the sole determinant of the growth rate of the economy.
The intuition is that the return on investments across activities should be
equal at steady state. Thus, if the return on innovation and the return on
standardization are different, there will be a reallocation of resources across
R&D activities. For example, if the return on standardization is larger than the
return on innovation, R&D investment will be reallocated to standardization.
The return on innovation will then increase as there will be less competition
in innovation.
We summarize the above results in the following proposition:
Proposition 2:Within the steady state regime with both innovation and stan-
dardization, growth rate is increasing in the patent length for standardization,
while independent of the patent length for innovation.
From the expression of welfare (equation (3.46)), we can see that the so-
cial welfare is determined by two factors: growth rate and the steady state
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consumption. The welfare effect of TH depends solely on its effect on steady
state consumption.
Proposition 3: For a given patent length for standardization, social welfare
is increasing in patent length for innovation if γ ≥ 1 and ξ(α−1)/α > 2− α.
Proof. With patent length for standardization TL fixed, the interest rate and
the growth rate of the economy will be fixed. Thus, the variation of TH can















. According to equation (2.44), ∂m
∂TH
= m(r + m). And



















(g − r) < 0.
From (2.22), we can see that c is a linear function of n. Thus, c is mono-





(1− e−gTL)(1− α)1/α + e−gTL
]





1− e−gTL + e−gTL(1− α)(α−1)/α
]}
+ µLg
Then we can rewrite it as:
dc
dn
= µLg + (1− α)2/αA1/αL
[ 1




(1− α)2 ](1− e







The summation of the last two terms lies between (1−α)1/αA1/αLξ(α−1)/α[1−
1/(1 − α)] and (1 − α)2/αA1/αLξ(α−1)/α[1 − 1/(1 − α)2]. Since (2 − α)(1 −
α)(1−α)/α < 1, the summation of the last two terms is smaller than (1 −
α)2/αA1/αLξ(α−1)/α
[
1− 1/(1− α)2]. Thus,
dc
dn
< µLg + (1− α)2/αA1/αL
[ 1







= µLg + (1− α)2/αA1/αL(1− ξ(α−1)/α)
[ 1





piM , µLg < piM if γ ≥ 1. Thus, dcdn < piM + (1 −
α)2/αA1/αL
(
1 − ξ(α−1)/α)[ 1
(1−α)2 − 1
]





1−α piH . Therefore, if the given condition is satisfied,
dc
dn
< 0. The welfare is then increasing in TH . Q.E.D.
The condition ξ(α−1)/α > 2 − α confines the marginal cost of low cost
production with an upper bound. Thus, this condition requires the profit for
low cost production to be large enough.
With a longer patent protection for innovation, more high cost products
are under patent protection. Longer patent protection will increase the return
to innovation. However, because of free entry to R&D activities, the resource
reallocation will equalize the returns to the two types of R&D activities. Thus,
the increase of standardization rate m and the decrease in the share of high
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cost products n will exactly offset the positive effect of longer patent on the
incentive to innovate. Therefore, higher TH always leads to lower n.
A lower fraction of high cost products n has two countervailing effects
on consumption. On the one hand, since low cost products are produced with
lower cost, more final output y will be produced with lower n. Moreover, lower
n means lower R&D investment on innovation and lower production input in
high cost goods. They all have positive effects on consumption. On the other
hand, lower n means higher R&D investment and production input to low cost
productions, which have negative effects on consumption. Proposition 3 shows
that the positive effect of lowering n on consumption always dominates as long
as the profit for high cost goods production is large enough. That is because
a lower n can release more production ability to final good production when
the profit gap between high cost production and low cost production is large
enough.
Proposition 4: With longer patent length for standardization, the optimal
patent length for innovation that maximizes social welfare is also longer.
Proof. According to Proposition 2, the optimal patent length for innovation
is the largest possible TH that leads to both innovation and standardization at
equilibrium. Denote it by T ∗H . T
∗
H is the solution to the equation (2.44) while






. Here, r is determined by the free
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entry condition in standardization. Thus r is an increasing function of TL.
Since T ∗H is increasing in r, it is straightforward that T
∗
H is increasing in TL.
Q.E.D.
When TH > T
∗
H , there will be a regime switch in the economy. To find the
optimal TH in the whole range, we also need to consider the welfare across dif-
ferent regimes. We will analyze the optimal TH across regimes in the numerical
section.
The effect of patent protection for standardization on welfare works through
both directions. On the one hand, longer patent protection for standardization
leads to higher growth rate. The reason is that the return on standardization
increases in TL, while the return on standardization and the return on in-
novation will be equalized at steady state. Higher return on R&D attracts
more investment to R&D, which leads to higher growth rate. On the other
hand, however, more investment to R&D sector takes up the final good that
was originally allocated to consumption. Moreover, longer protection for stan-
dardization leads to higher fraction of high-tech goods. This leads to lower
aggregate production of final good and thus decreases equilibrium consump-
tion. The net effect of higher TL on welfare depends on the relative magnitude
of the two forces.
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2.3.2 Equilibrium With Only Innovation
As discussed in Proposition 1, there will be no standardization when µH ≤
1−e−rTH
r
piH . This condition says that the value of an innovation is greater than
innovation cost even if the standardization rate is infinite. Thus, the return
from doing innovation is always higher than doing standardization. Therefore,
there is only innovation at equilibrium.
From the above section, we can see that when TH increases such that TH >
T ∗H , the economy encounters a regime switch which eliminates standardization.




L is a function of TH .
This regime, however, is different from the model we setup previously.
Because there is no standardization, it is impossible to find a consistent setup
for both Regime 1 and Regime 2 after the patent for innovation expires. In this
paper, we adopt two relatively consistent assumptions for Regime 2. (1) When
patent for innovation expires, the monopolistic firm continue to produce with
high cost forever and no one is able to imitate; (2) When patent for innovation
expires, the corresponding product is immediately imitated and been produced
competitively. Generally speaking, the first assumption is a special case of the
second assumption when patent for innovation goes to infinity.
With the first assumption, the equilibrium is independent of patent policies.
Firstly, there is no standardization. Thus TL does not influence any variable
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of interest. Secondly, since the monopolistic firm can produce forever, TH is
equivalent to ∞.
With the second assumption, the growth rate is now determined by TH ,










Different from previous setup, xCi is competitively produced with high cost
here. Thus,
y = (1− α)(1−α)/αA1/αL
[
(1− e−gTH )(1− α)(1−α)/α + e−gTH
]
(2.41)
The aggregate resource constraint is also different:
Y = C + N˙µH +NH(1− α)2/αA1/αL+NC(1− α)1/αA1/αL (2.42)
Thus, the expression for stationary consumption becomes:
c = y − µHg − (1− e−gTH )(1− α)2/αA1/αL− e−gTH (1− α)1/αA1/αL (2.43)
The interest rate and therefore the growth rate is determined by:
1− e−rTH
r
piH = µH (2.44)
From the above equation, we can see that the growth rate is increasing in TH .
This is consistent with the literature such as Zeng, Zhang and Fung (2014).
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Stronger patent protection enhances incentive to innovate and thus drives up
economic growth. This is the dynamic gain from stronger patent protection.
The effect of patent length TH on welfare is still determined by both growth
rate and consumption. From the expression for c, we can see that c is decreas-
ing in TH . This is the static loss from stronger patent protection. The effect of
TH on social welfare then depends on the relative magnitude of the dynamic
gain and static loss. Thus, according to Zeng, Zhang and Fung (2014), there
is a finite patent length that maximizes social welfare.3
2.3.3 Equilibrium With No Economic Growth
When µH ≥ piHr , there will be no economic growth at equilibrium, because
doing standardization is always more profitable than doing innovation. This





. The resulting equilibrium
implies that nobody wants to do innovation. Hence, there will be no available
high cost goods for standardization finally.
At first look, this seems counter-intuitive since IPR protection is always
considered as an important reason for economic growth. However, here we
argue that in some cases, too much IPR protection can also lead to poverty
trap and hinders economic growth in some countries. When patent protection
3One remark here is that the conventional optimal patent length may fall in Regime 1,
instead of Regime 2. When that happens, the optimal patent length will be the lower bound
for TH in Regime 2 which is also the upper bound of TH for Regime 1.
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for standardization increases, the growth rate always increases and generally,
social welfare will also increase. Thus, the government has higher incentive to
enforce stronger protection for standardization. When the patent protection
is strong enough such that the return to standardization is always higher than
the return to innovation, the R&D investment on high cost goods will be
transfered to standardize available high cost goods. With the available high
cost goods for standardizing diminished, the economy stagnates.
Generally speaking, this poverty trap is a result of higher return to stan-
dardization which makes equalization of returns across different R&D activ-
ities not possible. Even if all the R&D investment goes to standardization,
the return to standardization is still higher than the return to innovation.
Profit-seeking investment will never flow to innovation which results in zero
growth. To rule out the possible poverty trap resulted from patent protec-
tion for standardization, the government should limit the patent protection
for standardization, according to the comparison between the return to inno-
vation and the return to standardization.
However, depending on parameters, this regime may not always exist.
When piM/µL < piH/µH , there will be both innovation and standardization
even if TL →∞. In this case, doing standardization is not always more prof-
itable than doing innovation. Therefore, there is no poverty trap even as the
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Parameter ρ γ A α L ξ TH TL µH µL
Value 0.03 2 1 0.4 1000 0.7 10 10 450 265
Table 2.1: Benchmark Parameters
Parameter g r n m c y ω Γ
Value 0.0575 0.1549 0.4414 7.4287 188.8 434.9 0.1740 24.946
Table 2.2: Benchmark Equilibrium
patent length goes to infinity.
2.4 Numerical Analysis
2.4.1 Benchmark Model
In the benchmark model, we choose a discount factor ρ = 0.04 and the elas-
ticity of marginal utility γ = 2 to get a growth rate of g = 0.0575. We assume
the total population to be 1000 and the labor intensity in the final good pro-
duction α = 0.4. The patent length of both innovation and standardization
are assumed to be 10 years. We summarize the values of the parameters in
Table (2.1)
The corresponding equilibrium at steady state are given in Table (2.2).
2.4.2 Optimal Patent Length
To find the optimal patent length combination of patent length for innovation
and patent length for standardization, we allow TH and TL to vary from 0 to
40. In this section, we only consider the case when g > 0. In the first step,
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we consider the case when both innovation and standardization are present.
Then we extend our analysis to incorporate the case when innovation is always
more profitable than standardization.
Result with Both Innovation and Standardization
When both innovation and standardization present, the relationship between
social welfare and the two patent lengths is shown in Figure (2.2).
Figure 2.2: Two types of patent length and Welfare
When patent length for innovation is too high, the return to innovation is
always higher than standardization. Thus, there will be no standardization in
the economy and the model shrinks to the standard variety expansion model.
For now, we only consider the case when both innovation and standardization
are present.
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In that case, we can have the following results:
Result 1: For a given patent length for standardization, social welfare is
increasing in patent length for innovation TH .
Result 2: Social welfare has an inverse-U shape relationship with patent length
for standardization. Therefore, for a given patent length for innovation, there
is a finite patent length for standardization which maximizes social welfare.
Result 3: With longer patent length for standardization, the upper bound for
TH is also increasing.
Result 1 is consistent with Proposition 3. As discussed in Section 3, longer
patent length for innovation has countervailing effects on welfare. The positive
effect is that longer TH leads to lower fraction of high cost goods which expands
final output and reduces R&D investment to innovation. The final good that
is allocated to consumption then increases. The negative effect is that longer
TH leads to higher R&D investment to standardization and higher production
input to low cost production. These factors both lead to lower consumption.
According to Proposition 3, the positive effect always dominates.
For a given patent duration for innovation TH , patent duration for stan-
dardization TL also has countervailing effects on welfare. Longer patent length
for standardization increases the return on standardization. Because of free
entry to innovation and standardization, the returns to the two types of R&D
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investments will be equalized. Thus, larger TL implies larger growth rate g.
The static effects of TL on consumption are inverse U-shaped. When growth
rate effect dominates, longer patent protection for standardization increases
welfare. When static effect dominates, there will be an optimal patent length
for standardization.
Result 3 reinforces the conclusion in Proposition 3. With longer patent
duration for standardization, the return to standardization investments in-
creases. To have higher return on innovation than standardization, stronger
patent protection on innovation is required. That is why the upper bound on
TH is increasing in TL.
Result with no Regime 3
Since there is no Regime 3 in steady state if piM/µL < piH/µH , we show the
result with no Regime 3 in this section. We can just change the parameter
µL = 470 to make the condition satisfied. The following Figure (2.3)
4 shows
the result:
Result 1 to 3 from the above section still hold. In this case when TL =∞,
there are still positive innovation and positive standardization. This allows
the government to choose an infinite patent length for standardization with-
out generating poverty trap. Infinite patent protection for standardization
4To show the result for TL = ∞, we draw the result of TL = ∞ in the last line on the
figure where TL = 41.
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Figure 2.3: Patent Length and Social Welfare with no Regime 3
maximizes growth rate. However, the optimal patent length TL to maximize
welfare is still finite.
Result 4: For a given patent length for innovation, infinite patent length for
standardization maximizes growth rate, while the patent length for standard-
ization maximizes social welfare is still finite.
Uniform Patent Length
In practice, it is difficult to distinguish innovation and standardization be-
cause they are both innovations of the common definition. Therefore, it is
hard to adopt different patent lengths for innovation and standardization. In
this section, we assume the government adopt uniform patent length for both
innovation and standardization. Figure (2.4) shows the result:
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Figure 2.4: Uniform Patent Length and Social Welfare
The effect of uniform patent length on social welfare is inversed-U shape.
The optimal patent length is finite.
Result with Regime 1 and Regime 2
From above, we know that if patent length for innovation is too long or patent
for standardization is too short, the model shrinks to the standard variety
expansion model. We then need to extend our analysis to compare the optimal
patent length for innovation under both situations. According to the discussion
in Section 3, we adopt two different assumptions in Regime 2. Under the first
assumption, the welfare in Regime 2 is constant with respect to TH . That is
because the assumption is equivalent to infinite patent as long as TH > T
∗
H .
Since the first assumption is a special case of the second assumption, we only
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show the result with the second assumption. Under the second assumption, the
product is imitated immediately after the patent expires in Regime 2. That is
similar to saying that the standardization rate is infinite, in some sense. The
difference is that the production cost does not decrease after the change of
producer in Regime 2.
The following Figure (2.5) shows the result with both Regime 1 and Regime
2.
Figure 2.5: Two types of patent length and Welfare with degenerated model
If TH is larger than T
∗
H , the economy switches to Regime 2 and there is no
standardization at equilibrium. In Regime 2, ignoring the boundary problem,
welfare and growth rate are both independent of TL. According to Section
3, growth rate is increasing in TH and social welfare is an inverse U shaped
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function of TH . Considering the boundary, welfare is a decreasing function of
TH while TL is large. (The increasing part falls in Regime 1.) We then consider
both Regime 1 and Regime 2. Growth rate is initially independent of TH and
then increasing in TH after the boundary. Social welfare is initially increasing
in TH and then it has a sudden drop while switching to Regime 2. Maximum
social welfare in Regime 1 is larger than in Regime 2. This is the result of the
output expansion effect of standardization. The maximum of social welfare is
obtained on the boundary of Regime 1 before switching to Regime 2. We can
see clearly the effect of TH on welfare in the following figure (2.6)
Figure 2.6: Patent length for innovation and welfare
The following result summarizes the case with both Regime 1 and Regime
2:
Result 5: For a given TL, the optimal TH maximizing welfare is obtained
88
in the boundary of Regime 1 before switching to Regime 2; for a given TH ,
the optimal TL is obtained either with a finite value in Regime 1, or on the
boundary of Regime 1.
To obtain maximum social welfare, the optimal combination of patent
length for innovation and patent length for standardization is one with fi-
nite patent length for innovation and finite patent length for standardization.
Longer patent protection for innovation increases social welfare. However, a
caveat for the policy maker is that there is an upper bound for increasing
patent protection for innovation. If the patent protection for innovation is
too long, the economy can not enjoy the welfare gain from output enhancing
effect of standardization. Finite patent length for standardization comes from
both the possible poverty trap and too much dead weight loss from monopoly
power.
2.5 Conclusion
This chapter investigates the effects of patent length on social welfare and eco-
nomic growth in an endogenous growth model with two types of innovations
which we call innovation and standardization. Innovation introduces new vari-
ety and standardization lowers the production cost of the high cost products.
Therefore, we analyze both the effects of patent lengths for innovation and
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that for standardization. Different policies may lead the equilibrium to three
different regimes: regime with both innovation and standardization; regime
with only innovation; and regime with no economic growth.
We show that if patent length for standardization is too long, the economy
may fall in a poverty trap. When both innovation and standardization are
positive, growth rate is increasing in patent length for standardization while
independent of patent length for innovation. Given patent for standardization,
welfare is increasing in patent length for innovation. Given patent length
for innovation, welfare is an inverse U shape function of patent length for
standardization. The optimal combination of patent lengths for innovation




Distance to Frontier, Welfare
and Economic Growth with
Fiscal Policies
3.1 Introduction
Distance to frontier is the technological proximity of an economy to the leading
economy, and can be measured by the ratio between the total factor produc-
tivity in the economy and that of the leading country. Many studies, such as
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992), Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) and Evans
(1996), show that a large group of countries have been converging to parallel
growth paths over the past 50 years. However, although the long run growth
rate converges, the long-run technology gap spreads. This is the so-called
”conditional convergence”.
In the developing countries, shortening its long-run technological distance
to the frontier countries is sometimes as important as the desire to promote
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economic growth. If so, careful consideration should be made before the im-
plementation of any fiscal policy, since it might not be possible to ”kill two
birds with one stone”. Our main purpose in this paper is to analyze the effects
of capital income tax and labor income tax on the developing countries’ long
run technology distances to frontier as well as on the welfare and growth rates
of the economies.
It may not be apparent that shortening the technological distance to fron-
tier economy can be adopted by a government as a policy target. However, in
reality, it is a very important goal of government in developing countries such
as China to increase the technology level of the economy, and thus shorten
the distance to the frontier economy. A piece of evidence is the ”catching-
up strategy” adopted by many countries. China adopted this strategy in the
1950s. During that time, economic growth rate was not the primary goal of
economic policy while catching up the leading counties was more important.
There was a famous slogan in China: ”To catch up the British in three years,
and leapfrog the American in ten”. Even nowadays, technological progress in
some specific area is still one of the key performance index and a criteria for
promotion of Chinese government officials.
In this chapter, we explore the optimal tax mix within a quality improv-
ing model of growth framework. We assume that technology progression is
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obtained from two channels: technology adoption from the frontier economy
which is often in forms of imitation; and purposeful innovation targeted at the
local aggregate technology level. Both innovation and imitation requires two
types of R&D inputs: physical capital and labor. The taxation choice of the
government to finance a fixed amount of government expenditure then will
have different effects on the innovation and imitation incentives, and thus, on
the long run technology distance to frontier, welfare and growth rate of the
economy. Thus, the optimal strategy for the government requires balancing
these three targets.
We show that capital income tax financing leads to a higher steady state
welfare at the steady state. Steady state welfare is determined by consumption,
leisure, and growth rate. In the long run, growth rate converges to the frontier
technology growth rate, which is independent of the economy itself. Thus, the
negative growth rate effect of capital income tax is removed here. A higher
capital income tax always leads to lower incentive to accumulate, thus the
steady state consumption is always higher. The ratio of capital input and
labor input to R&D sector keeps constant in steady state. To match a lower
level of capital input to R&D, the required labor input is also lower. Thus,
a higher capital income tax results in a higher leisure level. Both higher
consumption and higher leisure determine a higher steady state welfare.
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Although higher capital income tax leads to higher welfare, it also results
in a longer distance to technology frontier, i.e. a lower relative technology
level. Higher capital income tax discourages accumulative input to R&D by
reducing capital accumulation. It then results in longer distance to technology
frontier in the long run.
On the transitional path to the steady state, starting from lower than
steady state capital stock and relative technology level, higher capital income
tax always leads to lower initial growth rate. Initial growth rate is taken as
the current growth rate. Current growth rate is determined both by current
distance to frontier and current R&D inputs including capital stock and labor
supply. Given the level of the relative technology level, higher capital income
tax discourages capital accumulation and thus lowers the growth rate.
Moreover, by analyzing the transitional path, we can also examine the
effects of taxation on total welfare including the welfare on the transitional
path. Our result shows that it is different from the effect on steady state
welfare. Higher capital income tax increases total welfare only when capital
income tax is small. However, when capital income tax is high, a further
increase capital income tax will decrease the total welfare. The reason is that
the negative effect of capital income tax on total welfare through lowering
capital stock and growth rate dominates the positive effect through higher
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consumption and leisure.
This chapter is related to several strands of literature. The first strand
is the literature on distance to frontier and global convergence. Technology
transfer and cross-country convergence is one of the most studied topics in
growth literature. Neoclassical literature pioneered by Solow (1956) usually
explains convergence as a result of decreasing returns to capital. [For ex-
ample, Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991).]
Endogenous growth literature, however, explains convergence from the view
of international knowledge spillover. [E.g. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997),
Aghion and Howitt (1998), Zeira (1998),Howitt (2000), Howitt and Mayer
(2002), Aghion, Howitt and Mayer (2005).] Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997)
explore the convergence implication of the endogenous growth model. In their
model, the leading countries do innovation while the followers do imitation.
In the long run, world wide growth rate is determined by leading economy.
Our model is consistent with theirs, but with the difference that the followers
do engage in both innovation and imitation activities. There is also a large
literature on club convergence explaining the fact that the growth rates of a
group of countries are converging to a same rate while others stagnate, such
as in Howitt (2000) and Aghion, Howitt and Mayer (2005). Our focus in this
chapter is on the group of countries that are converging and we are to examine
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the technology distance to frontier economy during the converging process.
Closely related to the convergence literature, several papers discuss the is-
sue of technology distance to frontier. Acemoglu, Aghion and Zilibotti (2006)
analyze the possible non-convergence trap because of inappropriate institu-
tions. Vandenbussche, Aghion and Meghir (2006) examine the education pol-
icy given the distance to frontier showing that skilled labor has higher growth
enhancing effect and thus higher education is more important closer to frontier.
We follow the two papers’ shared assumption that technology improvement is
obtained from both innovation and imitation. However, different from their
models, the innovation and imitation inputs are capital and labor in our model.
Moreover, the effects of fiscal policies on long-run distance to frontier and the
social welfare are not examined in their models.
This chapter also discusses the effects of taxation on welfare and current
growth rates. As to the issue of optimal capital income tax, the conventional
view advocates zero capital income tax. [E.g. Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976),
Ordover and Phelps (1979), Chamley (1986), Judd (1985)] The main intuition
is that relative price of consumption in the future with respect to consumption
today goes to zero or infinity if capital income tax is positive. Thus, positive
capital income tax is not optimal. Several later papers attempt to overturn the
result. Chamley (2001) find that capital income tax is not optimal when agents
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are credit constrained. Aghion, Akcigit and Fernandez-Villaverde (2013) ar-
gue that the result of Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985) no longer hold with
endogenous growth models. Our result in this chapter also supports positive
capital income tax, as positive capital income tax reduces the incentive to
accumulate as well as leads to lower labor income tax and therefore increases
consumption and leisure.
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 sets up the model; Section
3 analyzes the steady state equilibrium; Section 4 discusses the effects of tax-
ation on distance to frontier and steady state welfare; Section 5 examines the
transitional dynamics and the effects of taxation; Section 6 extends our anal-
ysis to allow for different capital and labor intensity in R&D inputs; Section
7 concludes.
3.2 The Model
The basic model adopts the technology distance to frontier framework de-
veloped by Acemoglu, Aghion and Zilibotti (2006). Following is a detailed
description of the economic environment in our model.
3.2.1 Productions
There are two types of production activities in the economy: final goods pro-
duction and intermediate goods production. The productivity improvement
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occurs through two channels: innovations and technology adoption from lead-
ing country. It is assumed that monopoly power exists in the intermediate
goods sector, while the final good production is perfectly competitive.
Final Goods Production
A final goods producer uses a continuum of intermediate goods and a fixed






αdi, Ait > 0, 0 < α < 1 (3.1)
where the subscript t refers to time; Ait is a productivity parameter; α mea-
sures the contribution of an intermediate good to the final goods production
and inversely measures the intermediate monopolist’s market power; F is the
quantity of the fixed factor; Yt is the final output; and Xti is the flow of inter-
mediate good i. For simplicity, we normalize the quantity of the fixed factor
to unity (F = 1). We also omit the time subscript t throughout the chapter
whenever there is no potential confusion caused. As a result, the final goods





αdi, A > 0, 0 < α < 1 (3.2)
Profit maximization in the competitive final goods sector implies the fol-





α−1, i ∈ [0, N ] (3.3)
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where Pi is the price of intermediate good i in terms of the final good. The
final good is used as the numeraire for all prices.
Intermediate Goods Production
Each intermediate producer i that has a patented technology and uses one unit
of final good to produce one unit of intermediate good. Given the interest rate r
and the final good sector’s demand for intermediate goods given by (3.3), each
intermediate good producer chooses the size of production that will maximize
its profit
Πi = PiXi −Xi = αA1−αi Xαi −Xi (3.4)
The solution to this maximization problem gives the demand function for






Πi = α(1− α)Aiα 2α1−α (3.6)
In a symmetric equilibrium, all firms have same productivity. Then the value
of Xi is independent of i and Ai is identical for all i. We can denote X ≡ Xi,
and rewrite Y as




As a result, the profit Π could be written as
Π ≡ α(1− α)Y (3.8)
i.e., aggregate monopoly profit Π will be proportional to aggregate final output
Y . This result implies that any policy that expands aggregate final output will
also raise the profit of intermediate production and thus stimulate innovation
and economic growth.
3.2.2 Technology Improvement
Technology improvements of the intermediate production are obtained from
two channels: (i) imitation activities aimed at adopting the world frontier
technologies; (ii) innovation upon the local technological frontier. Both inno-
vation and imitation use physical capital and labor as R&D inputs. In line
with Benhabib and Spiegel (1994), Acemoglu et al. (2006) and in particular
Vandenbussche et al. (2006), the dynamics of technology in sector i can be














where Kin, lin are the capital and labor hired for innovation and Kim, lim are
those for imitation. A¯ is the world productivity frontier at time t, and A is
the aggregate technology in the local economy. φ measures the elasticity of
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substitution between innovation and imitation in technology improvement and
0 < φ < 1. When φ = 1, innovation and imitation activities will be perfectly
substitutable. However, usually one may think that innovation and imitation
activities are complementary in some degree to facilitate technology progress.
That is, innovation and imitation are not perfect substitutes. In addition, to
avoid corner solution, we only consider the case when φ < 1. β is the capital
intensity in both sectors. λ and z are both constants scaling the technological
growth.
Firm i will then choose Kin, lin and Kim, lim to maximize the discounted













Γs = Πi − r(Kim +Kin)− w(lin + lim)
= α(1− α)Aiα 2α1−α − r(Kim +Kin)− w(lin + lim) (3.11)
Here, r is interest rate and w is wage rate. Firm maximizes the value of the
firm (equation (3.10)) subject to the dynamics of technology progress (equation
(3.9)). The current value Hamiltonian function for the problem is as follows:
H = α(1− α)Aiα 2α1−α − r(Kim +Kin)− w(lin + lim)
+µλ{[(Kim
A




















(1−β)φ = r (3.15)
Mµλz(1− β)Kβφin l(1−β)φ−1in A(1−β)φ = w (3.16)




e−rtµtAt = 0 (3.18)
where M ≡ {[(Kim
A
)βl1−βim (A¯ − A)]φ + z[(KinA )βl1−βin A]φ}
1−φ
φ . Equation (3.13)
(respectively (3.14), (3.15), (3.16)) equalizes the marginal benefit and marginal
cost of capital input in imitation (respectively, labor input in imitation, capital
input in innovation, labor input in innovation). Equation (3.17) is the optimal
dynamic condition for technology level.
3.2.3 Households
The model economy is populated by a continuum of infinitely lived identical




[lnC +  ln(L− l)] exp(−ρt)dt (3.19)
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where C is per capital consumption and ρ is the constant rate of time pref-
erence. l is the total labor supply which is allocated into either imitation or
innovation.  is the weight of leisure in utility function. The representative
household has a budget constraint:
C + K˙ = rK(1− τk) + wl(1− τl) + PF + χ (3.20)
where K is capital stock; PF is the return to the fixed factor; χ is the dividends
from R&D activities and intermediate productions; τk and τl are the taxes for
capital income and labor income, respectively. The representative household
chooses consumption C, the labor supply l to maximize its life-time utility,
subject to the budget constraint. The current-value Lagrange function for
this optimization problem is:
LDE = lnC +  ln(L− lt) + σ[rK(1− τk) + wl(1− τl)− C + PF + χ] (3.21)
where σ is the co-state variable associated with equation (3.20). The first-
order conditions for this optimization problem are (3.20) together with the
following conditions
C−1 = σ, (3.22)
(L− l)−1 = σwt(1− τl) (3.23)
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and
σr(1− τk) = −σ˙ + ρσ (3.24)
Equation (3.22) (respectively, (3.23)) equalizes the private marginal benefit
and cost of consumption (respectively, labor supply). Equation (3.24) are the
optimal dynamic conditions for capital accumulation.
3.2.4 Government Budget
Assuming that the government’s budget is balanced at each point in time, we
have:
G = rKτk + wlτl (3.25)
where the left-hand side is the total government expenditure, while the right-
hand side is the total revenue from capital income and labor income. We
assume that the government expenditure is a fixed fraction g0 of the final
output, i.e., Gt ≡ g0Yt, with 0 < g0 < 1.
The resource constraint of the economy is then:
Y = C + K˙ +G+X (3.26)
where output is allocated into consumption, investment, government expendi-
ture and intermediate good production.
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3.3 Decentralized Steady-State Equilibrium
In this section, we use the first-order conditions for consumer’s optimization
problem and the first-order conditions for (final good, intermediate good and
innovation) firms’ profit maximization problems to derive a system of equations
that describes the steady state equilibrium of the decentralized economy.
In the steady state, the labor supply (l = lm + ln) and interest rate (r)
are constant and all of the other variables (consumption C, physical capital
stock K and final output Y ) grow at the same constant rate. To describe the
steady state, we define q ≡ Q
A
in order to obtain a stationary model (Q could
be consumption C, physical capital stock Km and Kn and final output Y ).
Moreover, define ω ≡ w
A
. Then in the steady state, km, kn, k, c, y, ω are all
constant.




steady state, the growth rate of the decentralized equilibrium should converge
to g∗ as well. We can see this from equation (3.9). Since all the firms are
symmetric, we have Ai = A. Thus, we can rewrite equation (3.9) as:
A˙
A
= λ{kβφm l(1−β)φm (
A¯
A
− 1)φ + zkβφn l(1−β)φn }1/φ (3.27)
This result is similar to Vandenbussche et al (2006). The difference is that here
the R&D inputs are labor and physical capital instead of skilled and unskilled
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labor. Since A grows at a constant rate g, we have A˙
A
= g. Furthermore,









= g∗. It is straightforward that the relative
productivity of the local economy to the leading country a ≡ A
A¯
is also con-
stant in steady state. Clearly, a measures the technology distance to frontier
economy. a closer to 1 means the technology is closer to the frontier.




From equation (3.17), we have
µ = (1− α)α 1+α1−α r−1 (3.29)











Combining equations (3.13), (3.15) and (3.30) into equation (3.9) yields:
βg∗(1− α)α 1+α1−α r−2 = km + kn (3.31)









Equations (3.22) and (3.23) yield,
c =
ω(1− τl)(L− lm − ln)

(3.34)
Transforming the aggregate resource constraint to (1 − g0)y = c + (km +
kn)g
∗ + x, and plugging equations (3.33), (3.34) and (3.30), we have:
(1− g0 − α2)α 2α1−α − ω(1− τl)L

= (km + kn)
[








1−α (1− g0 − α2)
(1− τl)L −
βg∗2(1− α)α 1+α1−α r−2
(1− τl)L +
g∗(1− α)α 1+α1−α r−1(1− β)
L
(3.36)




















)(1−β)φr(1−β)φ−2]1/(1−φ). Plugging the above




− 1)φ/(1−φ) = βg
∗(1− α)α 1+α1−αωφ(1−β)/(1−φ)
ϕ2r2
− z 11−φ (3.39)
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The distance to frontier is determined by the capital income tax and labor
income tax as well as other parameters.
3.4 Government’s Problem of Choosing Single
Tax Financing and Mixed Taxes Financing
The government chooses the combination of a capital income tax rate τk or
a labor income tax τl (or mixed polices) to finance the government spending,
which is a constant fraction of the final output. There are three main concerns
of the government while deciding its policy choice: enhancing economic growth,
promoting social welfare, and moreover, shortening the technology distance to
frontier. The effects of the tax rates on the three targets may be different.
Thus, the government faces trade off to balance the three targets.
The policy choice must ensure the decentralized equilibrium condition,
equation (3.39), and government budget constraint, equation (3.25), are sat-
isfied. From equations (3.31), we have:
km + kn =
βg∗(1− α)α 1+α1−α (1− τk)2
(g∗ + ρ)2
(3.40)
It indicates that an increase in capital income tax will decrease the capital
level in a country. From equation (3.30) and (3.25), we have:
g0y = r(km + kn)τk + ω(lm + ln)τl = r(km + kn)(τk + τl) (3.41)
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From the above equation, we can derive:
g0α
2α
1−α (g∗ + ρ)
βg∗(1− α)α 1+α1−α
= (1− τk)(τk + τl). (3.42)




1−α (g∗ + ρ)
βg∗(1− α)α 1+α1−α (1− τk)
− τk (3.43)
3.4.1 Single Tax Financing
If the government only has access to capital income tax, to finance the required




1−α (g∗ + ρ)
βg∗(1− α)α 1+α1−α
(3.44)
However, if the government only has access to labor income tax, to finance




1−α (g∗ + ρ)
βg∗(1− α)α 1+α1−α
(3.45)
In this section, we consider the welfare effects and growth effects of taxa-
tions. The social welfare is measured by the lifetime utility of the represen-
tative household. Here, we only consider the steady state welfare . That is
to say, we assume the economy starts from steady state. In the following sec-
tion where we discuss the transitional dynamics, we will present the result for




















Proposition 1: With the access to only one tax instrument, to finance the
required expenditure which is a fixed share g0 of final output, the required capital
income tax rate τkgo is greater than the required labor income tax rate τlgo.
Proof. Obvious, from equations (3.44) and (3.45). Q.E.D.
From equations (3.36),and (3.34), we have:
c = α
2α
1−α (1− g0 − α2)− g




lm + ln =





1−α (1− g0 − α2)
(1− τl)(1− τk)
+
(1− α)α 1+α1−α g(1− β)
(g + ρ)
− g
2(1− α)α 1+α1−αβ(1− τk)
(1− τl)(g + ρ)2
}−1
(3.48)
Proposition 2: With the access to only one tax instrument, the steady state
welfare under capital income tax financing is greater than that under labor
income tax financing.
Proof. From equations (3.47) and (3.48) as well as τkgo > τlgo, it is easy to get
the consumption level is higher under capital income tax, while the total labor
supply is lower under capital income tax which implies a higher leisure level.
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, the welfare is higher under capital income tax. Q.E.D.
3.4.2 Mixed Taxes Financing
Combining (3.25) and (3.30), fixing the value of g0, we assign different values
to τk, to find the effects of mixed policies of τk and τl on the country’s steady
state welfare and technology distance to frontier. The analytical results are
hard to obtain in this case. Thus, we exploit the numerical results in the
following.
Benchmark Model
In this numerical example, we choose an exogenous worldwide growth rate
g∗ = 0.03. The population in the economy is assumed to be 1 and each
household is endowed with one unit of time. The discount factor ρ = 0.02 is
consistent with the literature. The leisure elasticity in utility  = 0.08 ensures
a labor supply of 0.6583. We assume that the capital intensity in the inputs
to productivity improvement is β = 0.4. The share of fixed factor in the final
production is chosen as 1− α = 0.3. φ measures the substitutability between
innovation and imitation in generating technology growth. We choose φ = 0.3,
λ = 0.02 and z = 1 to generate a steady state technology distance a = 0.6573.
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variable ρ  α λ β z φ g∗
value 0.02 0.08 0.7 0.02 0.4 1 0.3 0.03
Table 3.1: Baseline Parameter Values
variable a∗ l∗ ω∗ y∗ k∗ c∗ r∗
steady-state 0.6573 0.6633 0.0216 0.1893 0.1908 0.0908 0.05
Table 3.2: Initial steady-state values of variables
We can summarize the parameters and the steady state of the benchmark
model in the following Table (3.1) and Table (3.2).
Introducing Fiscal Policy
Government collects revenue from capital income tax and labor income tax
to finance the government spending. Assume that the share of government
spending in final output is g0 = 0.01. Next, we will compare the welfare
effects and technology improving effects of the two taxes. Firstly, we assume
government expenditure is financed only by capital income tax.
We get the following result which is consistent with Proposition 2:
Result 1: In terms of technology distance, labor income tax is superior to
capital income tax. However, capital income tax is superior to labor income
tax in terms of welfare.
Technology distance Welfare Tax rate
Capital income tax financing 0.4873 -48.0410 0.2729
Labor income tax financing 0.6440 -50.0408 0.1323
Table 3.3: Comparison of single tax financing
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Figure 3.1: Capital income tax and technology distance
Next, we use both capital income tax and labor income tax to finance
government spending. Figure (3.1) and Figure (3.2) show the effects of tax
changes on technology distance and welfare.
The results can be summarized as follows:
Result 2: With a constant share of government spending, relative technology
level decreases in capital income tax, while social welfare increases in capital
income tax.
Since the growth rate of the local economy converges to the growth rate
of the leading country, the steady state welfare is determined by steady state
consumption and labor supply. With higher capital income tax, there will
be lower incentive to accumulate capital. Therefore, the steady state capital
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Figure 3.2: Capital income tax and welfare
decreases in τk. Consumption then increases. On the other hand, higher
capital income tax means lower labor income tax. Lower labor income tax then
leads to lower wage rate and thus lower labor supply. Together, higher capital
income tax leads to higher welfare. This result is different from literature
because the growth rate effect of capital income tax is eliminated in the steady
state.
With higher capital income tax, there is a lower incentive to accumulate
which results in a lower steady state capital stock for R&D input. Moreover,
a lower labor income tax leads to lower labor supply. Both of the inputs to
technology improvement are decreasing in τk. Thus, the steady state relative
technology level is decreasing in τk. That is to say, the higher the capital
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income tax, the further the steady state distance to frontier economy.
3.5 Dynamics and Growth Effects of Policy
In this section, we analyze the dynamics of the model. From equation (3.22)
and (3.24), we have:
C˙
C
= r(1− τk)− ρ (3.49)
Since we define a = A
A¯




+ g∗. Letting c = C/A, k = K/A,
we can derive the dynamics of consumption:
c˙
c
= r(1− τk)− ρ− A˙
A
= r(1− τk)− ρ− a˙
a
− g∗ (3.50)
Combining equations (3.22) and (3.23), we have:










= km + kn (3.52)
































)(1−β)φr(1−β)φ−2]1/(1−φ). Plugging the above

















Combining equations (3.51), (3.30) and (3.52), we have
a˙ =
aω(1− τl)L− ac
(1− τl)(1− β)u − ag
∗ (3.57)
From the final goods clearing condition,we have:
k˙ = (1− g0 − α2)α 2α1−α − c− ( a˙
a
+ g∗)k (3.58)








The dynamics of the decentralized economy are then characterized by the
system of equations (3.17), (3.50), (3.57), (3.58) and (3.59), along with an
initial condition (k0, a0) and the static equations (3.53) and (3.56).
We consider the case when both the initial capital and initial relative tech-
nology level are below the steady state values. Specifically, we choose a0 = 0.3
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Figure 3.3: Transitional dynamics of key variables
and k0 = 0.15. The following Figure (3.3) shows the transitional dynamics of
the economy.
As seen in Figure (3.3), when the capital and relative technology are below
the steady state, the growth rate is higher than that of the leading country.
This is the so-called ”Advantage of backwardness” effects. The economies that
are further behind the frontier can enjoy higher growth rate through imitating
and importing the leading technologies. Along with the convergence of capital
and relative technology, the growth rate will also converge to the growth rate
of the leading economy.
To analyze the effects of tax on current growth rate, we let τk change from
0 to 0.27. Then by computing the initial growth rate, we have the following
relationship depicted in Figure (3.4).
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Figure 3.4: Capital income tax and initial growth rate
From Figure (3.4), we can see that higher capital income tax leads to lower
growth rate. This is consistent with the literature such as Chamley (1986) and
Lucas (1990). Higher capital income tax discourages capital accumulation
which then leads to lower initial growth rate. Linking this result with the
steady state effects of capital income tax, we can see that the government
faces trade-off between current economic efficiency (growth rate) and long-run
welfare while choosing the fiscal policy. Higher capital income tax increases
long-run social welfare, but decreases the long-run relative technology level
and reduces current economic growth.
We can revisit the welfare effects of taxation by including the welfare during
the transitional path. We adopt the cubic spline interpolation to interpolate
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the instantaneous welfare function u = [ln c+ gt+  ln(L− l)] exp(−ρt) to the
continuous time path and calculate the total welfare. Figure (3.5) shows the
relationship between capital income tax rate and the total welfare.
Figure 3.5: Capital income tax and total welfare
We can see that the relationship between capital income tax and welfare
is different from the steady state case. There is an inverse-U shape relation-
ship between capital income tax and total welfare. Higher capital income tax
reduces capital stock as well as growth rate on the one hand. Both leads to a
lower total welfare. On the other hand, higher capital income tax shifts the
entire consumption path and leisure path upwards. When capital income tax
is low, the positive effect of higher consumption and leisure on total welfare
overweights the negative effect of lower growth rate and capital stock. Total
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welfare is therefore increasing in capital income tax. When capital income
tax is too high, the accumulation effect of lower capital stock and growth rate
dominates the dis-savings from higher consumption and leisure. Therefore,
further increasing capital income tax will lead to lower total welfare.
3.6 Different Capital Intensity in Innovation
and Imitation
3.6.1 Steady State Analysis
In this extension, we examine the robustness of our results by assuming differ-
ent capital intensities in the imitation and innovation activities. The dynamics
















The value function of the firm is still the same. The current value Hamil-
tonian function for the problem is changed as follows:
































(1−θ)φ = r (3.64)
Mµλz(1− θ)Kθφin l(1−θ)φ−1in A(1−θ)φ = w (3.65)

























Combining equations (3.62), (3.64) and (3.68) into equation (3.10) yields:














Equations (3.22) and (3.23) yield:
c =




Transforming the final goods clearing condition to (1−g0)y = c+(km+kn)g∗+
x, and plugging equations (3.71), (3.72) and (3.68), we have:




1−α + (km + kn)g (3.73)

















To reduce the model to two key dimensions, which are distance to frontier,



























































Targets Technology distance Welfare Tax rate
Capital income tax financing 0.2178 -49.3818 0.1470
Labor income tax financing 0.2696 -61.3297 0.2097
Table 3.4: Sensitivity check of comparison of single tax financing
The above equation together with the following technology progress equation,

















To investigate whether the results above will change when the imitation ac-
tivity is more capital intensive and innovation activity is more labor intensive,
in this section, we assume β = 0.8 and θ = 0.3 (instead of β = θ = 0.4, used
previously).
Table (3.4) shows that the results for single tax financing still hold. From
Figure (3.6) and Figure (3.7), we can see when both taxes are used, technology
distance is still decreasing in capital income tax and social welfare is still
increasing in capital income tax.
3.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we assume that the technological progress of an economy comes
from both innovation and imitation. By introducing fiscal policy, we examine
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Figure 3.6: Sensitivity check of capital income tax and technology distance
Figure 3.7: Sensitivity check of capital income tax and social welfare
the growth effects and welfare effects of taxation mix. Moreover, we analyze
the effect of taxation on the long-run technology distance to frontier economy.
We find that higher capital income tax results in longer steady state dis-
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tance to frontier while it increases steady state welfare. By analyzing the
transitional dynamics, we show that higher capital income tax will lead to
lower current growth rate. The effect of capital income tax on total welfare is
inverse-U shaped.
The policy implication for government is then to balance not only between
growth rate and social welfare, but also to balance the long-run distance to
frontier and social welfare. Higher capital income tax increases social welfare,
but reduces the short run economic growth and long run relative technology
level of the economy. Low capital income tax in many developing countries
may not be because of the shortsightedness of the governments. It can also be
because the governments care more about the long run distance to frontier.
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